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INTRODUCTION 
The relevance of drug and alcohol involvement to 
sentencing law and practice is one of the most perplexing and 
unsettled areas of sentencing law and practice.1  It is also one 
of the most important issues in the criminal justice system.  
Most crimes are committed by offenders who are substance 
involved, and nearly half of all crimes that are committed are 
done so by offenders who are intoxicated at the time of the 
offense.  Substance involved individuals are grossly over-
represented in the criminal courts.  Addiction and intoxication 
impair sound judgment, and hence, it intuitively appears that 
intoxicated offenders are less culpable for their crimes.  
Moreover, there is often a sense that addiction and intoxication 
causes aberrant behavior and that curing the substance 
involvement will lead to more prudent (law-abiding) conduct. 
Yet the damage caused by crimes committed by 
intoxicated and addicted offenders is not diminished because 
their conduct was influenced by drugs or alcohol.  An 
individual is no less dead if he or she is killed by a drug 
addicted offender as opposed to another offender.  The 
competing issues relating to the sentencing of addicted and 
intoxicated offenders are complex.  The law regarding the 
relevance of substance abuse to sentencing is incoherent and 
confused.  Every conceivable approach is supposedly tenable.  
Substance abuse can sometimes mitigate or aggravate penalty, 
and at other times it remains neutral.  At other times it is 
neutral.  There are also a number of “fine” and often seemingly 
contradictory principles that have been developed in this area 
of law. 
This Article injects clarity into the manner in which the 
sentencing system should deal with intoxication and addiction.  
The most common reason that substance abuse has an impact 
on the sentencing calculus is because it supposedly effects the 
culpability of the offender.  It can reduce culpability because, 
so the theory goes, many substance involved offenders are not 
fully aware of the consequences of their actions.  It has also 
 
 1.  The principles governing both forms of addiction are similar.  See 
Damiani v Western Australia (2006) 165 A Crim R 358; [2006] WASCA 47, ¶ 2 
(Austl.); infra Part III. 
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been asserted that some individuals are driven to drugs and 
alcohol due to difficult life circumstances and this inclines 
them to criminal behavior.  On the other hand, substance 
involvement has also been held to necessitate a higher penalty2  
when the offender is aware that intoxication can lead to 
irresponsible behavior. 
An evaluation of the correctness of these approaches 
ostensibly invites exploration into what has been proven to be 
thus far intractable philosophical issues of free will: the bounds 
of personal responsibility and determinism.  The more sound 
approach, however, is driven by the clarity stemming from the 
overarching objectives of the criminal justice system.  This 
reference point commands that the principal determinant of 
offense severity is dictated by the level of harm caused by the 
crime.  The mental process and the precise causal levers that 
prompt an offender to commit crime are distant secondary 
considerations.  The distorting effect that drugs and alcohol 
have on an individual’s thinking, moral compass, and impulse 
control are all interesting and even compelling areas of 
learning.  But they are largely irrelevant from the perspective 
of a properly designed sentencing system.  In this domain, 
consequences, not behavioral triggers, are paramount.  This 
clarity is a key premise in this Article. 
Additionally, we examine and evaluate other reasons that 
have been given for incorporating substance involvement into 
the sentencing calculus.  These include the view that it is 
supposedly relevant to the prospects of rehabilitation.  While 
some programs seem to reduce the recidivism rate of substance 
affected offenders, other evidence suggests that overall these 
offenders have a significantly higher rate of reoffending than 
other offenders.3  From the perspective of the prospects of 
rehabilitation versus the higher rate of repeat offending by 
substance involved offenders, we effectively arrive at a “one all 
draw.”4 
An overarching and institutionally focused response to the 
problem posed by substance involved offenders suggests that 
substance use should not mitigate penalty.5  It should not 
 
 2.  See infra Part II. 
 3.  See infra Part III. 
 4.  See infra Part IV. 
 5.  See infra Part IV. 
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aggravate penalty.  The outcome of this proposition is not 
nuanced or complex.  It has one major advantage, however: it 
is doctrinally sound.  There are two further considerable 
advantages from this approach.  First, it can be effectively, 
readily, and transparently implemented.  Second, it injects 
jurisprudential and normative rigor into the sentencing 
calculus.  It corrects distortions to sentencing outcomes which 
stem from misguided theoretical underpinnings and 
unattainable sentencing objectives. 
Nevertheless, it is important to give due weight to the 
correlation between substance use and criminal conduct.  The 
link between substance involvement and crime should be 
promulgated and publicized.  There are many good reasons 
people have for not consuming drugs and alcohol.  The health 
reasons are generally well-known due to community education 
campaigns.  However, the criminogenic reasons are less 
evident.  The fact that people who take substances statistically 
have a much higher risk of committing crime6 and being 
sentenced to imprisonment should be promoted as an 
additional reason to desist from substance intake.  Further, 
more public health funding should be devoted to alcohol and 
drug programs in both the general community and criminal 
justice settings (including imprisonment). 
A limitation to the recommendations and discussion in 
this Article is that we do not focus on the relevance of 
substance involvement to capital cases.  The extreme nature of 
the death penalty often compels different jurisprudential 
principles.7  Excluding consideration of death penalty cases 
does not constitute a serious limitation to this Article.  The 
United States is the only developed nation apart from Japan 
that still imposes the death penalty.8  Moreover, not all states 
in America impose the death penalty9 and only a relatively 
 
 6.  See infra Part II. 
 7.  The proportionality principle derived from the Eight Amendment is, for 
example, applicable to the death penalty but rarely to other forms of punishment.  
See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 
U.S. 407 (2008). 
 8.  See Death Penalty Information Center: http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org
/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries?scid=30&did=140. 
 9.  There are thirty-two states which still have the death penalty.  States 
with and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited 
Aug. 21, 2015). 
2_BAGARIC FINAL 3/25/2016  9:44 AM 
2016] SUBSTANCE ABUSE & CRIME 247 
small number of criminals are executed in the United States.10 
We start in Part I by examining the extent of the 
connection between drugs, alcohol, and crime, and note that 
reliable studies establish that most individuals that commit a 
crime are substance involved and that nearly half of all 
offenders are intoxicated at the time of offending.  In Part II, 
we analyze and critique the existing law on substance abuse 
and sentencing.  We first consider the legal position in two 
jurisdictions: Australia and the United States.  This approach 
in Australia is illuminating because the courts have more 
expansively discussed the doctrinal underpinnings for taking 
substance involvement into account in the sentencing calculus 
than in the United States.  Australian sentencing law also has 
the same overarching objectives as that in the United States 
(namely incapacitation, general and specific deterrence, and 
rehabilitation).11  However, unlike the United States, there 
remains a large degree of judicial discretion reposed in 
sentencing decisions and this provides a useful reference point 
to this discussion.  Moreover, the extensive judicial 
examination of this issue in Australia could potentially 
enlighten the future direction and development of sentencing 
law in the United States, so far as it concerns substance 
involved offenders.  Reform proposals are set out in Part IV of 
the Article. 
I. THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM: MOST CRIMES ARE 
COMMITTED BY OFFENDERS WHO ARE SUBSTANCE 
INVOLVED 
In this Article we consider the connection between illicit 
drugs, alcohol, and crime.  This Article refers to both illicit 
drugs and alcohol as “substances.”  The illegal nature of certain 
drugs sets them apart from alcohol in some respects, namely 
they are often more expensive than alcohol and cannot be 
purchased and consumed in controlled doses.  Illicit drugs and 
alcohol both have the commonality that they can impair 
judgement and perception. Further, the coupling of alcohol and 
illicit drugs into the single generic category is consistent with 
 
 10.  Since 1976, there have been 1,413 executions.  Executions by Year, 
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-year 
(last updated Aug. 13, 2015). 
 11.  See infra Part II. 
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the approach taken in most studies and the literature 
examining the connection between substances and crime.12  
Accordingly, unless expressly indicated to the contrary in this 
Article, the term “substance” or “drug” refers to both alcohol 
and illicit drugs. 
Ascertaining the extent to which substance use 
contributes to crime is complex.  As noted by the Australian 
Institute of Criminology, in trying to ascertain the extent of 
crime that is drug related: “all estimates, including those 
presented in this study, rely on complex calculation techniques 
and assumptions that may not hold true in the real world.”13 
A. American Studies 
Despite these complexities, as noted below, numerous 
wide-ranging studies have been undertaken in an attempt to 
at least approximate the extent of the link between substance 
abuse and crime.  A 2010 report by The National Centre on 
Addiction and Substance Abuse, (proclaiming to be the “most 
exhaustive analysis ever undertaken to identify the extent to 
which alcohol and other drugs are implicated in the crimes and 
incarceration of America’s prison population.”14) reports that 
84.8% of all incarcerated offenders in United States at the time 
of survey (2006) were “substance involved.”15 
Most of these offenders (65%) satisfied the DSM-IV 
medical criteria for alcohol or drug abuse and addiction.16  The 
report is an update of the 1998 report by the same Centre17 
which showed that four out of five of America’s 1.7 million 
inmates (at that time) were substance involved in 1996.18  By 
 
 12.  See infra Part III. 
 13.   Jason Payne & Antonette Gaffney, How Much Crime is Drug or Alcohol 
Related? Self-reported Attributions of Police Detainees, 439 AUSTL. INST. OF 
CRIMINOLOGY 5 (2012). 
 14.  Behind Bars II: Substance Abuse and America’s Prison Population, 
CASACOLUMBIA (Feb. 2010), http://www.casacolumbia.org/addiction-research/
reports/substance-abuse-prison-system-2010.  The report notes: “To conduct this 
study, CASA analyzed data on inmates from 11 federal sources, reviewed more 
than 650 articles and other publications, examined best practices in prevention 
and treatment for substance-involved offenders, reviewed accreditation 
standards and analyzed costs and benefits of treatment.”  Id. at 1. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. at 1 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  CASA, Behind Bars: Substance Abuse and America’s Prison Population 
(1998). 
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the time the latter report was completed, the prison population 
had risen to 2.3 million and the rate of substance involved 
inmates had increased by approximately 5%.19  Not only is 
substance involvement endemic among offenders, in relative 
terms offenders are far more likely to use drugs than other 
individuals.  The 2010 Report notes that inmates are seven 
times more likely to have a substance abuse disorder than 
individuals in the general population.”20  A slightly greater 
portion of property offenders than violent offenders were 
substance involved (83.4% compared to 77.5%).21 
It is worth noting that the above report gives “substance 
involved” a wide definition and, in particular, it does not 
require a causal nexus between the substance use and the 
crime.  “Substance involved” refers to inmates who: 
• had a history of using illicit drugs regularly (i.e., 
one or more times a week for at least a month); 
• met medical criteria for a substance use disorder; 
• were under the influence of alcohol or other drugs 
when they committed their crimes; 
• had a history of alcohol treatment; 
• were incarcerated for a drug law violation; 
• were incarcerated for an alcohol law violation; or 
• had some combination of these characteristics.22 
The breadth with which substance involvement is defined 
does not establish a causal connection between drug or alcohol 
use and the present offense.  For example, the fact that an 
offender has previously sought alcohol treatment or at some 
point in his or her life used drugs during the month preceding 
the offense does not mean that drugs were a contributing factor 
to the present offense. 
Despite the wide definition of substance use by the above 
study, the findings are in keeping with other wide-ranging 
 
 19.  See Behind Bars II, supra note 14. 
 20.  Id. at 3.  In 2013, it was estimated that in the United States Overall, 17.3 
million people had an alcohol dependency and a further 6.9 million had an illicit 
drug dependency. Results from the 2013 National Survey on Drug Use and 
Health: Summary of National Findings, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
81 (2014), available at http://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH
resultsPDFWHTML2013/Web/NSDUHresults2013.pdf. 
 21.  Behind Bars II, supra note 14, at 2. 
 22.  Behind Bars II, supra note 14, at 3. 
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studies relating to the link between drugs and crime.  In terms 
of historic drug use (i.e., drug use that significantly predated 
the present offense), and drug use in the month prior to the 
offending, a report by the United States Bureau of Justice 
Studies also notes a strong association between substance use 
and crime.  The Bureau of Justice Studies report notes: 
In 1991, 60% of federal prisoners reported prior drug use, 
compared to 79% of state prisoners. In 1997 this gap in 
prior drug use was narrowed, as the percentage of federal 
inmates reporting past drug use rose to 73%, compared to 
83% of state inmates. By 2004 this gap was almost closed, 
as state prisoner reports of lifetime drug use stayed at 83%, 
while federal inmates rose to 79%. . . . Although the 
proportion of federal prisoners held for drug offenses 
dropped from 63% in 1997 to 55% in 2004, the percentage 
of all federal inmates who reported using drugs in the 
month before the offense rose from 45% to 50%.23 
A more illuminating and telling statistic regarding the 
connection between substance use and crime is the percentage 
of offenders who were under the influence of drugs or alcohol 
at the time of the crime (as opposed to those that used drugs in 
some defined period prior to the offending).  According to the 
2010 study conducted by the National Centre on Addiction and 
Substance Abuse, the figure was 42.8%.24  This is slightly 
higher than the survey data from the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, which still reports that a high number of offenders 
are intoxicated at the time of offending.  This data states: “In 
the 2004 Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional 
Facilities, 32% of state prisoners and 26% of federal prisoners 
said they had committed their current offense while under the 
influence of drugs.”25 
The Bureau of Justice Statistics also surveyed victims of 
violent offenses regarding their perception of the state of 
offenders.  According to the National Crime Victimization 
Survey (NCVS), the portion of victims who stated that they 
believed the offender was substance affected at the time of the 
offense is similar to the frequency reported by offenders: 
 
 23.  Jennifer C. Karberg & Christopher J. Mumola, Drug Use and 
Dependence, State and Federal Prisoners, 2004, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 
(Oct. 11, 2006), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=778. 
 24.  Behind Bars II, supra note 14, at 11. 
 25.  Karberg  supra note 23. 
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In 2007, there were 5.2 million violent victimizations of 
residents age 12 or older. Victims of violence were asked to 
describe whether they perceived the offender to have been 
drinking or using drugs.26  About 26% of the victims of 
violence reported that the offender was using drugs or 
alcohol.27 
Another close correlation between crime and drugs or 
alcohol arises when the offense is committed in order to 
purchase drugs.  The 2010 Report by the National Centre on 
Addiction and Substance Abuse states that 15% of offenders 
committed crime to obtain money to buy drugs.28  This figure 
is nearly identical to data reported by the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics which states that 17% of state inmates and 18% of 
federal inmates committed their offenses to obtain money to 
purchase drugs.29 
B. Australian Studies 
The empirical evidence from Australia regarding the link 
between drugs and crime is similar to that in the United 
States.  The most recent wide-ranging Australian study was 
undertaken by the Australian Institute of Criminology.  The 
study focused on self-reported causes of crime.30  The study 
consisted of 1,884 detainees who were interviewed in 2009.31  
Thus, the study was undertaken at the time of arrest.  The 
results of the Australian Institute of Criminology Australian 
study were in keeping with a study published in 2008, which 
asked detainees to report on not only the specific offenses for 
which they were detained, but also on all the offenses within 
the proceeding twelve months.32 
Most of the detainees (1,631, or 88%) reported using drugs 
in the 30 days prior to arrest (the number using illegal drugs 
was 1,113, and alcohol 1,376).33  Similar to the situation in the 
 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Behind Bars II’, supra note 14, at 11. 
 29.  Karberg  supra note 23. 
 30.  See Payne, supra note 13. 
 31.  Id. at 1. 
 32.  T. Makkai & J. Temple, Drugs and Crime: Calculating Attributable 
Fractions, in COUNTING THE COST: ESTIMATES OF THE SOCIAL COSTS OF DRUG 
ABUSE IN AUSTRALIA IN 2005–2006 (D. Collins & H Lapsley eds., 2008). 
 33. Payne, supra note 13.  Many detainees used both drugs and alcohol, and 
thus, the combined figure (2,489) is more than the total number of detainees 
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United States, the rate of substance abuse among offenders in 
Australia is far higher than the general community.34 
According to the Australian Institute of Criminology 
report, approximately half of all detainees (45%) attributed 
their offending to either drug or alcohol use, or both.35  The 
drug-crime attribution for alcohol was 30%, while for illegal 
drugs it was 19%36 (with heroin having the highest attribution 
level—54% of users37—and LSD had the lowest attribution 
level—9%38).  For offenders who attributed their offending to 
illicit drug use, 25% stated they committed the crime to get 
money to purchase drugs; 40% stated that they were 
intoxicated at the time of the offense; 20% stated they were 
“hanging out for drugs”; and 38% gave other reasons.39  The 
same questions were not asked of those who attributed their 
offending to alcohol—it was assumed that the majority of crime 
which was attributed to alcohol was on the basis that the 
offender was intoxicated.40 
In total, the detainees were charged with 4,237 offenses, 
including: 753 violent offenses, 867 property offenses, and 896 
relating to a breach of justice order.41  In all, 48% of the offenses 
were said to be attributable to either drug or alcohol use.42  
Most detainees (52%) who were charged with property offenses 
attributed their crimes to drugs (37%) or alcohol (21%)43; while 
a slightly lower portion (42%) of violent offenders attributed 
 
(1,631). 
 34.  2007 National Drug Strategy Household Survey: Detailed Findings, 
AUSTRALIAN INST. OF HEALTH & WELFARE (Dec. 18, 2008), 
http://www.aihw.gov.au/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=6442459906. 
 35.  Payne, supra note 13. 
 36.  Payne, supra note 13. 
 37.  Payne, supra note 13, at 3.  Only 11.4% of the sample used heroin in the 
past 30 days. 
 38.  Payne, supra note 13, at 3.  Only 2.3% of the sample used LSD in the 
previous 30 days. 
 39.  Payne, supra note 13, at 4.  The figures do not equate to 100 because 
some interviewees gave more than one answer. 
 40.  Payne, supra note 13, at 4. 
 41.  Payne, supra note 13, at 4. 
 42.  Payne, supra note 13.  This figure is different to the number of detainees 
that were substance involved (45%) because some detainees were charged with 
more than one offense. 
 43.  Payne, supra note 13.  The combined total of drugs and alcohol does not 
equate to the whole because some offenders attributed their offending to both 
substances. 
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their crimes to drugs (12%) or alcohol (34%).44 
The profiles of the individuals who are the subjects of the 
key reports above vary slightly.  The United States data relates 
to inmates (i.e., convicted offenders), whereas the Australian 
data refers to individuals who have been charged with offenses.  
However, in real terms the cohorts are similar, given that in 
Australia more than 90% of charged offenders are found 
guilty.45 Accordingly, in light of the large number of individuals 
involved in the respective studies and the fact that the studies 
relate to two different countries, three reasonably conclusive 
observations can be made regarding the link between 
substances and crime: 
• The majority of criminal offenders are substance 
involved; 
• A large portion of offenders (over 30%) commit their 
offense while under the influence of alcohol or illicit 
drugs at time of the offense; and 
• Nearly 20% of offenders commit crime to purchase 
drugs. 
 
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW  
We now analyze the manner in which sentencing law 
currently deals with the substance involved offenders.  In 
doing so, we first discuss the situation in Australia, given that 
it is in this jurisdiction that the issue has been subject to the 
greatest amount of judicial discussion and evaluation.   
A. Substantive Involvement and Australian Sentencing 
Law 
1. Overview of Australian Sentencing Law and 
Practice 
Prior to examining the relevance of intoxication to 
sentencing, we first provide an overview of the sentencing 
 
 44.  Payne, supra note 13, at 45.  The combined total of drugs and alcohol 
does not equate to the whole because some offenders attributed their offending to 
both substances. 
 45.  MIRKO BAGARIC & RICHARD EDNEY, AUSTRALIAN SENTENCING: 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 2014). 
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regime in Australia.  Sentencing law differs in each Australian 
jurisdiction (the six states, Northern Territory, the Australian 
Capital Territory, and the Federal jurisdiction).46  However, 
there is considerable convergence in relation to a number of 
key areas.47  All Australian jurisdictions pursue the same 
fundamental objectives of sentencing, in the form of 
incapacitation (also referred to as community protection), 
general deterrence, specific deterrence, rehabilitation, and 
retribution.48 
By contrast to the sentencing system in the United 
States,49 a distinctive aspect of the Australian sentencing 
system is that courts normally have a wider discretion 
regarding choice of penalty.50  Fixed penalties for serious 
offenses in Australia are rare.51  The reasoning process that 
judges undertake in making sentencing decisions is known as 
the “instinctive synthesis.”52  This is a mechanism whereby 
sentencers make a decision regarding all of the considerations 
that are relevant to sentencing and then give due weight to 
each of them (and, in the process, incorporate considerations 
that incline to a heavier penalty and offset against them 
factors that favor a lesser penalty) and then set a precise 
penalty.53  “The hallmark of this process is that it does not 
require (nor permit) judges to set out with any particularity 
the weight (in mathematical terms) accorded to any particular 
consideration.”54  Patent subjectivity is incorporated into the 
sentencing calculus.  Current orthodoxy maintains that there 
is no single correct sentence55 and that the “instinctive 
synthesis will, by definition, produce outcomes upon which 
reasonable minds will differ.”56  Under this model, courts can 
impose a sentence within an “available range” of penalties.  
 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  See infra Part II.B. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  The term originates from the decision in R v Williscroft (1975) VR 292 
(Austl.). 
 53.  R v Williscroft (1975) VR 292. 
 54.  Mirko Bagaric, Sentencing: From Vagueness To Arbitrariness—The Need 
to Abolish the Stain that is the Instinctive Synthesis in Australian Sentencing 38 
UNIV. OF NEW SOUTH WALES L.J. 76. (2015) . 
 55.  Markarian v The Queen (2005) HCA 25, ¶27, ¶133. 
 56.  Hudson v The Queen (2010) 205 A Crim R 199, 206. 
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The spectrum of this range is not clearly defined. 
Some degree of predictability57 is injected into the 
sentencing system by the fact that the proportionality principle 
is adopted in all jurisdictions.58  This is the main determinant 
of sentence type and severity.  A clear statement of the 
principle is provided by the High Court of Australia in Hoare v 
The Queen, where the Court stated: “[A] basic principle of 
sentencing law is that a sentence of imprisonment imposed by 
a court should never exceed that which can be justified as 
appropriate or proportionate to the gravity of the crime 
considered in the light of its objective circumstances.”59 
Another defining aspect of Australian sentencing law is 
the large number of considerations (more than 200) that can 
either mitigate or aggravate penalty.60  There are four 
categories of mitigating factors.61  The first are those relating 
to the offender’s response to a charge and include pleading 
guilty62 and remorse.63 The second category consists of factors 
that relate to the circumstances of the offense and which 
contribute to, and to some extent explain, the offending.  These 
include mental impairment64 and provocation.65  The third 
category relates to matters that are personal to the offender, 
such as youth,66 and good prospects of rehabilitation.67  The 
impact of the sanction is the fourth broad type of mitigating 
factor, and includes considerations such as onerous prison 
 
 57.  However, as noted below the level of predictability is relatively minor.  
See Bagaric, supra note 54, at 77. 
 58.  BAGARIC & EDNEY, supra note 45. 
 59.  Hoare v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 348, 354. 
 60.  Compare JOANNA SHAPLAND, BETWEEN CONVICTION AND SENTENCE: 
THE PROCESS OF MITIGATION 43 (1981) (identifying 229 factors), with LA TROBE 
UNIV., GUILTY, YOUR WORSHIP: A STUDY OF VICTORIA’S MAGISTRATES’ COURTS 
(1980)  (identifying 292 relevant sentencing factors’). 
 61. See VICTORIAN SENTENCING COMMITTEE REPORT, SENTENCING 359–60 
(1988). 
 62.  See Cameron v The Queen (2002) 209 CLR 339 (Austl.). 
 63.  R v Whyte (2004) 7 VR 397; Barbaro v The Queen (2012) VSCA 288; 
Phillips v The Queen (2012) VSCA 140. 
 64.  See R v Tsiaras (1996) 1 VR 398; see also Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 
244 CLR 120; R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269. 
 65.  Va v The Queen (2011) VSCA 426. 
 66.  R v Neilson (2011) QCA 369; R v Kuzmanovski; Ex parte Attorney-General 
(Qld) (2012) QCA 19. 
 67.  R v Osenkowski (1982) 30 SASR 212; R v. Skilbeck (2010) SASCFC 35; 
Elyard v The Queen (2006) NSWCCA 43. 
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conditions,68 and public opprobrium.69  Additionally, there are 
also a large number of aggravating factors, including: prior 
criminal record,70 high level of planning,71 offending committed 
while on bail,72 and breach of trust.73 
The obscure nature of the proportionality principle,74 the 
large number of aggravating and mitigating considerations, 
and the fact that judges do not indicate the weight or emphasis 
accorded to each consideration are the key reasons that 
sentencing in Australia remains unpredictable and 
inconsistent.75  The largely unfettered discretionary nature of 
Australian sentencing calculus is similar to the uncontrolled 
sentencing process used in parts of the United States fifty 
years ago, which led Justice Marvel Frankel to describe the 
system as lawless.76  In a similar vein, in Mistretta v. United 
States it was noted that indeterminate sentencing had been 
criticised for producing “ ‘ shameful’ consequences . . . [in the 
form of a] . . . great variation among sentences imposed by 
different judges upon similarly situated offenders . . . [and] . . . 
uncertainty as to the time the offender would spend in 
prison.”77  The fact that sentencing principles in Australia are 
not densely prescribed by statute provides the opportunity and 
catalyst for extensive judicial development and analysis of 
sentencing concepts.  This includes the role that alcohol and 
illicit drug78 involvement should have in sentencing. 
 
 68.  Western Australia v O’Kane (2011) WASCA 24; R v Puc (2008) VSCA 159; 
Tognolini v The Queen (2012) VSCA 311. 
 69.  Ryan v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 267. 
 70.  Field v The Queen (2011) NSWCCA 13; Saunders v The Queen (2010) 
VSCA 93. 
 71.  R v Yildiz (2006) 160 A Crim R 218; R v Douglas (2004) 146 A Crim R 
590. 
 72.  R v Gray (1977) VR 225; R v Basso (1999) 108 A Crim R 392; R v AD 
(2008) NSWCCA 289. 
 73.  Director of Public Prosecutions v Truong (2004) VSCA 172; Carreras v 
The Queen (1992) 60 A Crim R 402; Attorney-General v Saunders (2000) TASSC 
22; Hill v The Queen (1999) TASSC 29; R v Ottobrino (1999) WASCA 207; R v 
Black (2002) WASCA 26. 
 74.  See Mirko Bagaric, Injecting Content into the Mirage that is 
Proportionality in Sentencing (2013) 25 NEW ZEALAND UNIV. L. REV. 411 (2013). 
 75.  BAGARIC & EDNEY, supra note 45. 
 76.  Marvin E. Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order (1972).  For 
a critique of Frankel’s impact, see Lynn Adelman & Jon Dietrich, Marvin 
Frankel’s Mistakes and the Need to Rethink Federal Sentencing, 13 BERKELEY J. 
CRIM. L. 239 (2008). 
 77.  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366 (1989). 
 78.  The principles governing both forms of substances are similar. See 
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This issue is marked by a high degree of uncertainty in 
terms of identification of the relevant theoretical principles 
and even more so when it comes to operationalizing any 
principles.  In more understated terms, the Court of Criminal 
Appeal of New South Wales recently in Kukovec v R stated: 
“the relevance of drug addiction in a sentencing exercise is a 
matter of some complexity.”79  There are authorities which 
support every possible outcome regarding the impact that 
substance involvement should have on sentencing.  Sometimes 
it has been held to be neutral (i.e., of no relevance), and at other 
times it has been considered either an aggravating or 
mitigating consideration.  Thus, we see that in R v Koumis & 
Ors it was stated that addiction is not of inherent relevance to 
sentencing: 
Drug addiction is not of itself a factor that necessarily calls 
for a lesser sentence than would otherwise be appropriate.  
The sentence to be fixed has to reflect the seriousness of the 
crime of trafficking in substantial quantities of a drug of 
dependence.  Denunciation and general deterrence assume 
particular importance as the purposes to be effectuated by 
the sentence.  Generally speaking, addiction and any 
consequential impairment of judgment, will not have any 
significant mitigatory effect upon those sentencing 
considerations.80 
By contrast, in Vozlic v The Queen, the same Court noted 
that “[a] fact such as drug addiction is a circumstance of the 
offender which will often have an intrinsic relevance in the 
sentencing process.”81 
2. The Relevance of Substance Involvement to 
Sentencing in Australia  
We now consider in greater detail all of the ways in which 
substance involvement can impact sentencing.  We start with 
an examination of the case law suggesting it should have no 
impact, and then consider the circumstances in which it has 
been held to aggravate penalty.  We then consider cases that 
 
Damiani v Western Australia (2006) 165 A Crim R 358 ; [2006] WASCA 47, [2]. 
 79.  [2014] NSWCCA 308, [30]; see also Trajkovski v The Queen (2011) VSCA 
170. 
 80.  R v Koumis & Ors (2008) VSCA 84, [53]; see also R v SK (2009) NSWCCA 
21. 
 81.  Vozlic v The Queen (2013) VSCA 113, [26]. 
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suggest that substance involvement can be a mitigating factor. 
It is desirable to commence this part of the discussion by 
considering the authorities which suggest that substance 
involvement should not impact penalty.  It is in this context 
that the relevance of substance abuse to sentencing has been 
considered most thoroughly.  A major theme is the extent to 
which substance abuse can impact on the culpability of an 
offender.  Key to this analysis is supposedly the degree of 
choice the offender had in taking drugs or alcohol.  To this end, 
there are four broad situations in which substance abuse can 
be potentially relevant to sentencing: 
(i) The choice to initially commence using drugs; 
(ii) Succumbing to a craving to continue to use drugs; 
(iii) Committing a crime to feed a drug craving (for 
example, selling drugs to pay for a drug habit); and 
(iv) Committing a crime while under the influence of 
drugs, which impairs the judgement of the offender 
(for example, assaulting a victim as a result of a 
minor provocation). 
The above four considerations were considered in the 
landmark decision of R v Henry,82 where the New South Wales 
Court of Criminal Appeal issued a guideline judgment in 
respect of the offense of armed robbery.83  One of the issues 
raised was the relevance of drug addiction to sentencing armed 
robbers.  In this case, the offender was addicted to drugs and 
committed the crime to raise money to feed his drug habit.84  
The majority of the Court held that the offender’s drug habit 
did not justify a reduced (or increased) sentence.  In particular, 
Spigelman CJ held that committing an armed robbery to 
obtain funds to fund a drug addiction is not mitigatory.85 
 
 82.  (1999) 46 NSWLR 346; 106 A Crim R 149. 
 83.  A guideline judgment is a sentencing decision which purposively sets out 
for other courts the main considerations which are relevant in ascertaining an 
appropriate penalty for a particular crime or the circumstances in which it is 
appropriate to impose a certain type of sanction. 
 84.  R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346, 347. 
 85.  See also, Johan v R (2015) NSWCCA 58.  As discussed below, this is in 
contrast to where an offender sells drugs to feed a drug habit, in which case drug 
use is often regarded as a mitigating consideration.  The contrast is made out in 
R v Bouchard (1996) 84 A Crime R 499, at 501 in the following terms: ‘it may be 
conceded that it [addiction] is a relevant and sometimes very significant factor in 
sentencing that an offender engaged in trafficking, especially at ‘street level’, in 
order to gain the wherewithal to satisfy his own craving, rather than as a non-
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In reaching this conclusion, Spigelman CJ had regard to 
the neurobiological evidence regarding the causes and realities 
of substance use.86  Spigelman CJ concluded that at the key 
different stages of the substance abuse cycle, individuals have 
genuine choices regarding their actions.87  These choices may 
not always be completely free; however, he noted that this is a 
reality that relates to many personal choices.88  People, on his 
assessment, need to take full moral and legal ownership for all 
of their actions which they perform pursuant to a substantial 
degree of choice.  This, he suggested, was the situation in 
relation to all aspects of the drug-offending cycle.  Spigelman 
CJ stated: 
The authorities are against the proposition that drug 
addiction should, of itself, be accepted as a mitigating 
factor.  There is authority that where the original addiction 
was not a willed act, that may be taken into account by way 
of mitigation.  The authority does not go beyond. . . .  It was 
submitted that the degree of moral culpability of a 
particular offender is diminished by addiction.  Evidence 
was put before the Court that there is, at least in some 
cases, a genetic predisposition to addiction and that 
addiction generally is not simply a state of mind but has a 
neurobiological or physiological base.  It was put that an 
addict’s decision to perform a criminal act was not “a 
completely free choice”.  In my opinion drug addicts who 
commit crime should not be added to the list of victims.  
Their degree of moral culpability will vary, just as it varies 
for individuals who are not affected by addiction.  There are 
a number of aspects of the relationship between drug 
addiction and crime which indicate that moral choices are 
made.  First is the original decision to experiment with 
drugs which, in the usual case, is a completely free choice.  
The addictive quality of drugs, together with the anti-social 
behaviour which so commonly results from addiction, is so 
widely known that persons who choose a course of addiction 
must be treated as choosing its consequences.  Secondly, the 
submissions in this Court were in error in identifying the 
relevant conduct as the craving associated with 
 
user acting purely for reasons of greed and in callous disregard of the grave harm 
that offense does to its victims. But it is quite unsafe, in my opinion, to reason 
from cases concerning narcotics to a case of armed robbery.” 
 86.  Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346, [200]. 
 87.  Id. at 197-210. 
 88.  Id. at 197. 
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withdrawal.  The material presented to the Court did not 
suggest that the choice faced by addicts was between this 
negative feeling and the need for money to allay it.  Rather 
the choice may often be the desire for the positive feeling 
said to be associated with a drug induced euphoria.  The 
desire to bring about that state of “well-being” is, 
relevantly, a moral choice.  Thirdly, nothing in either the 
process of addiction or its neuro-biological and physiological 
basis, leads ineluctably to the commission of crime, let 
alone the commission of crimes of violence against persons, 
such as armed robbery.  Not all persons who suffer from 
addiction behave in this way.  Those that do so, make a 
choice. . . .  There is no warrant, in my opinion, to assess a 
crime induced by a need for funds to feed a drug addiction, 
as being lower in the scale of moral culpability than other 
perceived requirements for money.89 
Simpson J in R v Henry took a different (minority 
dissenting) view regarding the reality of choice experienced by 
many offenders who have substance abuse problems.90 In 
relation to the decision to start using drugs (or alcohol), she 
takes the view that this is often a symptom of an underlying 
problem, and hence, the choice is far from free.  Simpson J 
states: 
In the worst, or least forgivable, cases it may have its 
origins in arrogance, in an antipathetical attitude to the 
laws of society, or in weakness of character.  In other cases, 
I have no doubt, it has its origins in social disadvantage, 
poverty, emotional, financial, or social deprivation, poor 
educational achievement, unemployment, and the despair 
and loss of self-worth that can result from these 
circumstances or any combination of them.  In this court 
one sometimes sees cases in which drug taking stems from 
sexual assault or exploitation, sometimes committed when 
the person who turns to drugs, and who comes before the 
court, is very young, and sometimes the precipitating 
events have occurred many years before.  Drug addiction is 
not always the disease; it is, as often as not, a symptom of 
 
 89.  Id. at 194-202.  The position of Spigelman CJ is echoed by Wood CJ, 
“[t]here remains for every offender a choice between reform and recidivism, and 
the problem is better addressed by the development of adequate programs and 
rehabilitation options within the prison environment, than it is by a significant 
change in sentencing policy.”  Henry, at [267]. 
 90.  Id. at 332–56. 
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social disease.91 
She adds: “Drug addicts do not come to their addiction 
from a social or environmental vacuum.  This court should not 
close its eyes to the multifarious circumstances of 
disadvantage and deprivation that frequently precede and 
precipitate a descent into illegal drug use.”92 
Further, she states that the concept of choice is even less 
apt regarding the decision to continue to use drugs: 
Nor can I accept that the exercise of free choice in the use 
of drugs is always of equal dimensions.  It is not every 
decision to use drugs that can properly or fairly be 
characterized as a decision made in the exercise of free 
choice.  The will of an individual can be overborne, or 
undermined, not only by acts of another person, but also the 
pressure of circumstances.  I do not accept that most drug 
offenders are truly exercising free will when they choose the 
degradation, despair, criminality and cycle of 
imprisonment that can follow the initial use of illegal drugs.  
The circumstances that propel the offender to use of drugs 
are often, if not usually, beyond his or her control.  They 
may or may not be combined with a vulnerable personality 
or even a weakness of character.  Many drug offenders have 
not had the life experiences or the normal developmental 
path that permit a conclusion that the decision to take 
drugs was a decision made in the exercise of a free choice in 
the sense in which that phrase is ordinarily understood.93 
Thus, neither the majority nor minority in Henry take 
issue with the link between crime, drugs, and alcohol.  The key 
difference relates to the notion of choice, and the extent to 
which the choice to use drugs, and continue with their use is 
“free.” 
In order to fully understand this contrast, it is important 
to note that there is a distinction in the criminal law between 
responsibility and culpability.  The concept of responsibility is 
binary.  Individuals are criminally responsible for a crime if 
they have committed the actus reus of the offense, have the 
relevant mens rea, and there is no applicable defense.94  To 
 
 91.  Id. at 336. 
 92.  Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346, 337. 
 93.  Id. at 338. 
 94.  KEN J. ARENSON ET AL., AUSTRALIAN CRIMINAL LAW IN THE COMMON 
LAW JURISDICTIONS (4th ed., 2015); MARKUS DUBBER & MARK KELMAN, 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed., 2009). 
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satisfy the mens rea requirement, it is necessary for offenders 
to intend to commit the crime or act recklessly in relation to its 
occurrence.  Some defenses are grounded in the absence of free 
will, with duress being the clearest example.95  If mens rea and 
actus reus are established, and an offender cannot establish a 
defense, he or she will be responsible for the crime. 
Unlike responsibility, culpability comes in degrees.  It 
relates to the level of moral and legal blameworthiness of an 
offender.  This is a concept that is often invoked in sentencing 
law.96  Considerations that often are thought to diminish 
culpability include: youth of the offender, and lack of 
planning.97  Moreover, a diminished level of freedom or choice 
is normally associated with reduced culpability, thus mental 
illness and diminished cognitive culpability are often 
associated with reduced culpability.98 
The debate between Simpson J and Spigelman CJ does not 
(if the words of Simpson J are taken literally) relate to a matter 
of degree of choice or culpability.  Simpson J goes so far as 
stating that some substance abused offenders have their will 
overborne, in a similar way to that which occurs as a result of 
pressure by another person99.  Simpson J is, in effect, of the 
view that the path chosen by some substance abused offenders 
is so lacking in autonomous choice that they are not 
responsible for their actions, in the same way that individuals 
who commit crimes under coercion are not guilty.  Spigelman 
CJ, on the other hand, believes that diminution of choice is so 
minor that it does not relevantly diminish the level of blame, 
even for sentencing purposes.  Thus, we see that their Honours 
 
 95.  For a discussion of the elements of duress, see Monu Bedi, Excusing 
Behavior: Reclassifying the Federal Common Law Defenses of Duress and 
Necessity Relying on the Victim’s Role, 101 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 575 (2011). 
 96.  BAGARIC & EDNEY, supra note 45. 
 97.  BAGARIC & EDNEY, supra note 45. 
 98.  For a discussion of this, see STANFORD LAW SCHOOL, WHEN DID PRISONS 
BECOME ACCEPTABLE MENTAL HEALTHCARE FACILITIES?, 2 (2014); Note, The 
Psychology of Cruelty: Recognizing Grave Mental Harm in American Prisons, 128 
HARV. L. REV. 1250 (2015); Developments in the Law: The Law of Mental Illness, 
121 HARV. L. REV. 1114 (2008); E. Lea Johnston, Vulnerability and Just Desert: 
A Theory of Sentencing and Mental Illness, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147 
(2013); Ian Freckelton, Sentencing Offenders with Impaired Mental Functioning 
R v Verdins, Buckley and Vo, 14 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL., & L. 359 (2007); James 
Ogloff et al., Psychiatric Symptoms and Histories among People Detained in Police 
Cells, 46 SOC. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 871 (2011). 
 99.  R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346, 338. 
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take a vastly different approach to the considerations that 
effect drug and alcohol use, and ultimately the ramifications 
this has for sentencing.  In Part III of this Article, we analyze 
and critique these approaches. 
Before doing so, it should be noted that more recently, it 
has been confirmed that armed robberies committed to feed a 
drug problem do not merit less punishment than armed 
robberies committed for other reasons.  In R v Omar, the Court 
stated: 
[I]t would involve an exercise in irresponsibility on the part 
of the Court, if it were understood as a message that 
committing the crime of armed robbery to feed a drug habit 
is less deserving of censure than would otherwise be the 
case.  The legislature has, by the heavy maximum penalty 
prescribed for armed robbery, spoken clearly in relation to 
this offense.  Drug dependent persons should not be 
encouraged, as a class, to think that they are free to engage 
in serious criminal conduct of whatever kind with 
impunity, or with any hope of favourable treatment because 
they are able to show that they needed money through their 
addiction.  In summary, I see no reason to depart from the 
planks of punishment, retribution and rehabilitation that 
underlie the sentencing process generally, and that permit 
of individualised sentencing by reference to the objective 
and subjective circumstances of each case.100 
This is in contrast to a drug trafficking offense.  It has been 
held that drug addicts who sell drugs solely to feed their habit 
should receive a lower penalty than offenders who sell drugs 
solely for greed.101  Further, it has been noted that it is unclear 
whether this is because of an absence of an aggravating factor, 
or because trafficking for addictive reasons is itself 
mitigatory.102 
Substance involvement is, on occasion, treated as an 
aggravating consideration.103  This is most commonly the case 
when the offender has knowledge that intoxication may lead to 
criminal behavior.  The level of the awareness that an offender 
is required to have that intoxication could result in criminal 
 
 100.  [2015] NSWCCA 67, [274]-[276]. 
 101.  R v Koumis & Ors (2008) VSCA 84. 
 102.  Id. at 51; see also Vozlic v The Queen [2013] VSCA 113; R v Nagy [1992] 
1 VR 637. 
 103.  See e.g., R v Fletcher-Jones (1994) 75 A Crim R 381, 386–88; R v Groom 
(1999) 2 VR 159, 164; R v Gordon (1994) 71 A Crim R 459. 
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behavior is unclear.  It is not a matter that has been 
extensively discussed by the authorities.  However, to the 
extent that the issue has been canvassed, it seems that the 
standard is readily satisfied—previous offending or 
inappropriate behavior while intoxicated on any substance 
would seem to suffice. 
In R v Martin, the court sentenced an offender for a 
murder committed while he was under the influence of 
amphetamines.104 In rejecting the submission that the use of 
drugs was mitigating, and finding the opposite—that it was an 
aggravating factor—the Court set out the relevant principle in 
the following manner: 
Voluntary ingestion of drugs should be approached no 
differently from intoxication, in our view.  The critical 
question will be what the probable consequences of the 
ingestion of the particular drug by the particular offender 
were, and whether the offender foresaw those 
consequences. . . .  For these reasons, we agree with the 
sentencing judge that the applicant’s drug-induced 
psychosis was an aggravating factor.  The contention that 
his self-induced psychotic state was a mitigating factor 
cannot be sustained.  His moral culpability is the greater 
because of his foreknowledge of the likely consequences of 
his continued drug-taking, and his decision to continue 
doing so, even when he was experiencing paranoid 
delusions.  In this sense, there is an important element of 
deliberateness or premeditation about the course of conduct 
on which the applicant embarked, which ultimately caused 
the death of an innocent man.105 
In Damiani v Western Australia, the court stated that 
“self-induced addiction at an age of rational choice establishes 
moral culpability for the predictable consequences of that 
choice.”106  In R v Robazzini,107 the appellant pleaded guilty to 
a number of violent offenses committed while he was under the 
influence of drugs and alcohol.108  The Court held intoxication 
 
 104.  R v Martin (2007) VSCA 291. 
 105.  Id. 30, 53.  See also, R v McCullagh (2003) 141 A Crim R 150, 158; R v 
Currie (1988) 33 A Crim R 7, 9; Baumer v The Queen (1987) 27 A Crim R 143; R 
v Laffey [1998] 1 VR 155. 
 106.  (2006) 165 A Crim R 358, 3 
 107.  (2010) VSCA 8. 
 108.  Id. at 1–2. 
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was an aggravating factor.109  In doing so, it rejected a 
submission that the consumption of drugs and alcohol can only 
be aggravating if the offender previously offended while under 
the influence of the same substance.  The Court stated: 
If a person acts violently after taking a legal or illicit drug 
for the first time, he may be unaware of the effect that the 
drug may have on him, so that his drug use should not be 
taken into account as an aggravating factor.  In this case 
however, the appellant had used a number of different 
drugs for many years.  He was well aware that they had a 
disinhibiting effect on him.  His moral culpability is not 
reduced because the “cocktail” he took before he committed 
these offenses was not precisely the same as the different 
mixtures of drugs he may have taken on other occasions 
when he acted violently.110 
Thus, the test that must be satisfied in order for substance 
involvement to be an aggravating factor is broad.  It seems to 
be capable of being established even if there is a single instance 
of prior criminal behavior while the offender was affected by 
drugs or alcohol.  The type of substance in question does not 
need to be identical to that which previously underpinned or 
coincided with the criminal behavior, and it seems that there 
does not need to be a close similarity between the respective 
crimes.111  The test would seem to have an objective and 
subjective component: the offender must have actually 
committed a crime while previously being drug or alcohol 
affected, and must also be aware of this event.112 
Substance abuse can also be aggravating in more narrow 
circumstances.  For example, it has been held that intoxication 
is also aggravating where it makes the offense more 
frightening for the victim.113  Addiction can also increase 
sentence because it increases the risk of recidivism.  As noted 
by Wood CJ at Common Law in R v Henry, substance abuse 
can: “impact upon the prospects of recidivism/rehabilitation, in 
 
 109.  Id. at 60. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  See Edwards v the Queen (2011) VSCA 87 at 5; R v Dosen (2012) VSCA 
307 at 6. 
 112.  The clearest instance of this is where the offender consumes drugs or 
alcohol and knew of its effect on him or her. See R v Fletcher-Jones (1994) 75 A 
Crim R 381; R v Hay (2007) VSCA 147 at 18. 
 113.  R v Groom (1998) VSCA 146, 24, citing R v Sewell (1981) 29 S.A.S.R. 12 
at 14–15. 
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which respect it may on occasions prove to be a two-edged 
sword.”114 
Another way in which substance involvement can relate to 
sentencing is by reducing the penalty.  It has been held that it 
can have this effect for a variety of reasons.  The first is where 
it reduces the culpability of the offender because, for example, 
it supposedly caused the offender to act out of character.115  In 
order it to have this effect, the onus is on the offender to 
establish that he or she did not know that intoxication might 
lead to criminal conduct.  In Vergados v The Queen, the Court 
stated: 
If the respondent was aware that by taking the drug, his 
judgment would be so affected that he would behave 
irrationally or that it would affect his ability to exercise 
control, his self-induced mental state would not constitute 
a mitigating circumstance.  It was for the respondent to 
establish on the balance of probabilities that he did not 
know that the drug would have such effects.116 
Substance abuse can also reduce the penalty where it 
directly impacts on other recognized sentencing variables 
which can mitigate sentence.  It can do this in several ways.  
First, it can be relevant to the degree of planning; which is in 
fact ultimately relevant to culpability.  In Arbili v. The Queen, 
Schmidt J (with whom Hulme J agreed) stated: 
 
 114.  R v Henry (1999) NSWCCA 111 [273]; see also R v McKee [2003] VSCA 
16, at [13]; R v Hammond [1996] QCA 508; (1997) 2 Qd R 195, 199–200.  The 
possible relevance of addiction to rehabilitation is considered below.  See Damiani 
v Western Australia (2006) 165 A Crim R 358; [2006] WASCA 47 at 3, where it 
was stated: “intoxication or addiction will be weighed against the other relevant 
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, such as danger to the community and 
prospects of rehabilitation (Channon v The Queen (1978) 33 FLR 433; 20 ALR 1, 
per Brennan J at [5] and Deane J at [21]; Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1987) 164 
CLR 465; [1988] HCA 14 at 476).”  The fact that an offender suffers from 
alcoholism does not justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment for the sole 
purpose that rehabilitation will be more likely to occur in a custodial setting.” 
 115.  In Morrison v The Queen (2012) VSCA 222 at 17, it was held that alcohol 
abuse may be mitigating where the offender has no previous indication that it 
may cause him or her to engage in criminal conduct.  Zelling, J in R v Sewell 
(1981) 5 A Crim R 204, at 207, stated: “. . .[A] person under the influence of liquor 
who is otherwise of blameless character may do something which is quite out of 
character and the liquor may be both an explanation and a factor in mitigation, 
but in other cases it may swing the penalty towards deterrence.”  See XY v R 
[2007] NSWCCA 72, [28]-[29]. 
 116.  (2011) VSCA 438, 47, citing Director of Public Prosecutions v Aryanitidis 
(2008) VSCA 189, 29; see also Mune v The Queen (2011) VSCA 231, 32. 
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This court has said on countless occasions that addiction to 
heroin is not to be considered as a factor for the reduction 
of what would otherwise be an appropriate sentence for the 
nature of the offenses which have been committed.  It 
serves, however, to provide an explanation for the 
commission of the offenses . . . .  Drug addiction is one of the 
circumstances of a particular offense that is relevant to the 
sentencing exercise.  It may, for example, be pertinent to 
the issue of impulsiveness/planning or to the weight to be 
given to rehabilitation in a particular case.117 
As noted in Morrison, addiction can also mitigate penalty 
on the basis of rehabilitation.118  However, in order to do so, 
there must be “strong evidence of real progress towards actual 
rehabilitation.”119  In R v. Proom, Doyle CJ stated: 
Addiction to drugs may indicate that assurances by an 
offender of a desire to be rehabilitated are unreliable, or 
must at least be treated with caution, and sadly may mean 
that even a genuine wish to rehabilitate may have to be 
treated with caution.  In the worst case, if there is no reason 
to think that the addiction will be broken, there will be no 
basis for leniency by reference to the prospect of 
rehabilitation.120 
Drug influenced offending can also be mitigating if the 
offense is committed while an offender experiences a psychotic 
reaction while trying to withdraw from drugs.121 
There are also a number of authorities suggesting that 
substance involvement can be mitigatory where it was not 
willed (i.e., there were other circumstances inclining an 
individual to escape the realities of his or her life) and drugs or 
alcohol played a role in the commission of a crime.  In Brown v 
The Queen, a thirty-one year old accused who had a long 
criminal history pled guilty to breaking and entering, and drug 
trafficking offenses.122  He grew up in a violent household and 
 
 117.  [2012] NSWCCA 48, 173-74 (quoting R v Valentini (1989) 46 A Crim R 
23 at 25); see also Waters v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 219 at [37] , where lack of 
planning was a mitigating factor for an intoxicated offender. 
 118.  See Morrison v The Queen (2012) VSCA 222, 20. 
 119.  Brown v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 335, 29, citing Simpson J in R v 
Henry (1999) NSWCCA 111 at 244. 
 120.  [2003] SASC 88, [50]. 
 121.  R v Sebalj (2006) VSCA 106 at [15]; see also R v Robazzini (2010) VSCA 
8 at [61]. 
 122.  [2014] NSWCCA 335 at [2]. 
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commenced using drugs at the age of about nine or ten.123 He 
was using drugs at the time of these offenses, although at the 
time of sentencing he was drug free.124  In mitigating the 
sentence, the Court endorsed the observation of Wood CJ at CL 
in R v. Henry, which stipulated the drug offending can be 
relevant to offender’s culpability by: 
suggest[ing] that the addiction was not a matter of personal 
choice but was attributable to some other event for which 
the offender was not primarily responsible, for example 
where it arose as the result of the medical prescription of 
potentially addictive drugs following injury, illness, or 
surgery (cf Hodge Court of Criminal Appeal New South 
Wales 2 November 1993; and Talbot); or where it occurred 
at a very young age, or in a person whose mental or 
intellectual capacity was impaired, so that their ability to 
exercise appropriate judgment or choice was 
incomplete. . .125 
However, this principle is not consistently applied.  In 
Avdic v The Queen, the Court sentenced a twenty-six year old 
pregnant woman for armed robberies she committed while 
under the influence of drugs.126  She resorted to using drugs to 
deal with the mental suffering stemming from sexual abuse 
she experienced when she only fifteen years of age.127  The 
court accepted that it was a result of this traumatic event that 
the offender starting using drugs, and that this resulted in her 
moral compass being distorted.128  The offender was drug free 
at the time of sentencing and the Court accepted that she had 
reasonable prospects of rehabilitation.  No mitigation was 
accorded for the fact that the drug abuse stemmed from what 
was described as a “gross physical assault.”129 
This is in contrast to the more recent decision of El-Ahmad 
v. The Queen, where the court provided a sentencing discount 
to a substance addicted offender convicted of drug trafficking.  
The offender had been addicted to drugs at an early age as a 
result of the trauma of being forced into an arranged (abusive) 
 
 123.  Id. at 10–11. 
 124.  Id. at 12–13. 
 125.  [1999] NSWCCA 111 at [273]. 
 126.  [2012] VSCA 172 at [2]. 
 127.  Id. at 11. 
 128.  Id. at 11. 
 129.  Id. at 10. 
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marriage.130  The applicant sold drugs in order to give her the 
means to acquire drugs to feed her own addiction.131  The court 
held: 
The applicant has a number of features of her subjective 
case that demanded some amelioration of her sentence.  
Counsel pointed to her “really parlous start to life”, 
undergoing an arranged marriage at the age of 13 to a close 
relative who was physically and verbally abusive and 
introduced her to drugs.  Although her drug addiction 
cannot be regarded in any way as an excuse for her crimes 
the fact that it had its origins in such circumstances in her 
teenage years is of some significance: R v Henry [1999] 
NSWCCA 111; 46 NSWLR 346 at [273](c) (Wood CJ at CL).  
True it is that she eschewed the opportunity for 
rehabilitation under the Drug Court program and that it is 
an aggravating feature that her offenses were committed 
whilst she was on that and other forms of conditional 
liberty.  But it my view the overall subjective case for the 
applicant is one that justifies a measure of leniency that 
could not ordinarily be extended in a case involving flagrant 
and serious involvement in drug supply.132 
Where addiction to drugs or alcohol is for medicinal 
purposes and this contributes to the commission of offense, the 
courts will normally mitigate the penalty.133 
B. Substance Involvement and United States Sentencing 
1. Overview of United States Sentencing Law and 
Practice 
As is the case in Australia, each state in the United States 
and the federal jurisdiction has its separate sentencing 
system.134  Each system has distinctive features, but there are 
important over-arching commonalities of sentencing 
throughout the United States.  At the broadest level, the main 
objectives of sentencing are uniform and are the same as those 
 
 130.  El Ahmad v R [2015] NSWCCA 65 at 19 . 
 131.  Id. at 17. 
 132.  Id. at 73. 
 133.  Talbot v R (1992) 59 A Crim R 383; see also JUDICIAL COLLEGE OF 
VICTORIA, VICTORIAN SENTENCING MANUAL 10.10.1.4 (2015), available at 
http://www.judicialcollege.vic.edu.au/eManuals/VSM/index.htm#6189.htm. 
 134.  Sentencing (and, more generally, criminal law) in the United States is 
mainly the province of states.  See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 
(2000) (citing U.S. v. Lopez 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995)). 
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found in Australia, namely: community protection (also known 
as incapacitation), general deterrence, specific deterrence, 
rehabilitation, and retribution.135  While the objectives are 
relatively uniform, they are not equal in weight.  Community 
protection has been the overwhelming aim of sentencing in the 
United States over the past forty years.136 
The goal of community protection has been most markedly 
pursued through the enactment of prescriptive sentencing 
laws, which significantly limited judicial discretion.137  Fixed, 
minimum, or presumptive penalties138 now apply (to varying 
degrees) in jurisdictions in the United States.139 Prescribed 
penalties are typically set out in sentencing grids, which 
normally use criminal history scores140 and offense seriousness 
to calculate the appropriate penalty.  The penalties prescribed 
in the grids have been heavily criticized for being too harsh.  
Typical of this sentiment is the following observation by 
Michael Tonry: 
Anyone who works in or has over time observed the 
American criminal justice system can repeat the litany of 
tough-on-crime sentencing laws enacted in the 1980s and 
 
 135.  See United State Supreme Court, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, United 
States Sentencing Comission Guidelines Manual, http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines-
manual/2014/2014-ussc-guidelines-manual, (last visited Feb. 11, 2015) 
[hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N] .’ 
 136.  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF THE INCARCERATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 9 (Jeremy 
Travis et al. eds., 2014). 
 137.  Id. at 3.  As noted by William W. Berry III, “Prior to 1984, federal judges 
possessed discretion that was virtually “unfettered” in determining sentences, 
guided only by broad sentence ranges provided by federal criminal statutes.  The 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the “Act”) moved the sentencing regime almost 
completely to the other extreme, implementing a system of mandatory guidelines 
that severely limited the discretion of the sentencing judge.”  William W. Berry 
III, Discretion Without Guidance: The Need to Give Meaning to § 3553 After 
Booker and its Progeny, 40 CONN. L. REV. 631, 633 (2008). 
 138.  For the purposes of clarity, these both come under the terminology of 
fixed or standard penalties in this Article. 
 139.  They are also one of the key distinguishing aspects of the United States’ 
sentencing system compared to that of Australia (and most other sentencing 
systems in the world).  See UNIV. OF SAN FRANCISCO SCHOOL OF LAW, CENTRE 
FOR LAW AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: U.S. SENTENCING 
PRACTICES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 46-47 (2012), available at 
https://www.usfca.edu/sites/default/files/law/cruel-and-unusual.pdf  (noting that 
137 of 168 surveyed countries had some form of minimum penalties but none 
were as wide-ranging or severe as in the United States). 
 140.  This is based mainly on the number, seriousness, and age of the prior 
convictions. 
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the first half of the 1990s: mandatory minimum sentence 
laws (all 50 states), three-strikes laws (26 states), life-
without-possibility-of-parole laws (49 states), and truth-in-
sentencing laws (28 states), in some places augmented by 
“career criminal,” “dangerous offender,” and “sexual 
predator” laws (Tonry 2013).  These laws, because they 
required sentences of historically unprecedented lengths 
for broad categories of offenses and offenders, are the 
primary causes of contemporary levels of imprisonment 
(Travis and Western 2014, chap. 3).141 
It has been contended that none of these policies leading 
to the increase in fixed penalties emanated from a clear 
theoretical foundation, but rather stemmed from “back-of-an-
envelope calculations and collective intuitive judgements 
[sic].”142  In a similar vein, Berman and Bibas stated, “[o]ver 
the last half-century, sentencing has lurched from a lawless 
morass of hidden, unreviewable discretion to a sometimes rigid 
and cumbersome collection of rules.”143 
The most extensively analyzed prescribed penalty laws are 
found in the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines 
Manual (“Federal Sentencing Guidelines”).144  These 
Guidelines are important because of the large number of 
offenders sentenced under this system and the significant 
doctrinal influence they have exerted at the state level.145  
Accordingly, to the extent that this Article analyzes United 
States sentencing law, the main focus is on the federal 
jurisdiction. 
Like most grid sentencing systems, the key considerations 
 
 141.  Michael Tonry, Remodeling American Sentencing: A Blueprint for 
Moving Past Mass Incarceration, CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y (Forthcoming 
MINNESOTA LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER NO. 14–26). 
 142.  Michael Tonry, The Questionable Relevance of Previous Convictions to 
Punishments for Later Crimes, in PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING 91 
(Julian V. Roberts & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 2010).  For further criticism of the 
Guidelines, see James S. Gwin, Juror Sentiment on Just Punishment: Do the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines Reflect Community Values? 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 173 (2010); Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical 
Failure of the Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85, 92–93 (2005). 
 143.  Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 37 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 37, 40 (2006). 
 144.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 135, at 394. 
 145.  See Berman & Bibas, supra note 143, at 38. There are more than 200,000 
federal prisoners.  See E. Ann Carson, Prisoners in 2013, BJS.GOV,  
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=5109 (last updated Sept. 30, 
2014). 
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that determine the nature of the penalty are the perceived 
severity of the offense and the criminal history of the 
offender.146  Prior convictions can have a considerable impact 
on penalty, and in some cases lead to an approximate doubling 
of the sentence.  For example, an offense at level fifteen147 in 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines carries a presumptive 
penalty for a first offender of imprisonment for eighteen to 
twenty-four months, which increases to forty-one to fifty-one 
months for an offender with thirteen or more criminal history 
points.148  For an offense at level thirty-five, a first offender has 
a guideline penalty range of 168-210 months, which increases 
to 292-365 months for an offender with the highest criminal 
history score.149  Thus, an extensive bad criminal history can 
add 155 months (more than twelve years) to a jail term. 
Following the U.S. Supreme Court decision of United 
States v. Booker,150 the Guidelines are no longer mandatory; 
rather they are effectively advisory in character.151  Recent 
 
 146.  See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing 
Factors? 88 B.U. L. REV. 1109, 1109 (2008). 
 147.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 135, at 50.  The offense levels 
range from 1 (least serious) to 43 (most serious).  Id. 
 148.  Id. at 399.  The criminal history score ranges from 0 to 13 or more (worst 
offending record).  Id. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  In Booker, the Supreme Court held 
that aspects of the guidelines that were mandatory were contrary to the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial.  Id.; see also Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 
1229, 1236 (2011)  (“[W]hen a defendant’s sentence has been set aside on appeal, 
a district court at resentencing may consider evidence [that may] support a 
downward variance from the now-advisory Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
range”); Irizarry v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2198, 2203 (2008)  (“there is no longer 
a limit comparable to the one at issue in Burns on the variances from Guidelines 
ranges that a district court may find justified under the sentencing factors set 
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)”); see also Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 
(2008) ; see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007)  (“[W]hile the extent of 
the difference between a particular sentence and the recommended Guidelines 
range is surely relevant, courts of appeals must review all sentences—whether 
inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a 
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard”).; see also Rita v. United States, 551 
U.S. 338, 339 (2007)  (holding that federal appellate court may apply presumption 
of reasonableness to district court sentence that is within properly calculated 
Sentencing Guidelines range). 
 151.  Consequently, District Courts are required to properly calculate and 
consider the guidelines when sentencing, even in an advisory guideline system.  
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(4), (5); Booker, 543 U.S. at 264 (“The district courts, 
while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must . . . take them into account when 
sentencing.”); Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465 (stating that a district court should begin 
all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines 
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decisions have also held that the imposition of a sentence about 
the statutory maximum based on facts other than a prior 
conviction is violative of the Sixth Amendment unless it is 
based on facts found by the jury or admitted by the 
defendant.152  Nevertheless, the guideline range remains a very 
influential sentencing reference point.  Until recently, 
sentences within guidelines were still the norm.153 In 2014, for 
the first time Federal Courts imposed more sentences that 
were outside the Guidelines than sentences that were within 
them.154  The margin is small (54% to 46%), but it does reflect 
a trend by the judiciary to view the Guidelines with less 
stricture than previously.155 
 
range); Gall, 552 U.S. at 48  (“As a matter of administration and to secure 
nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point and the 
initial benchmark.”).  The district court, in determining the appropriate sentence 
in a particular case, therefore, must consider the properly calculated guideline 
range, the grounds for departure provided in the policy statements, and then the 
factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  See Rita, 551 U.S. at 350-51.  See also, Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007)  (“A district judge must consider the extent of 
any departure from the Guidelines and must explain the appropriateness of an 
unusually lenient or harsh sentence with sufficient justifications. An appellate 
court may take the degree of variance into account and consider the extent of a 
deviation from the Guidelines, but it may not require ‘extraordinary’ 
circumstances or employ a rigid mathematical formula using a departure’s 
percentage as the standard for determining the strength of the justification 
required for a specific sentence.”) 
 152.  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000); see also Blakely v. 
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)  (holding that the “statutory maximum” is the 
maximum sentence that may be imposed solely on the basis of the facts found by 
the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant); see also Alleyne v. United States, 
133 S. Ct. 2151, 2162 (2013) . 
 153.  Sarah French Russell, Rethinking Recidivist Enhancements: The Role of 
Prior Drug Convictions, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1135, 1160 (2010); see also Amy 
Baron Evans & Jennifer Niles Coffin, No More Math Without Subtraction: 
Deconstructing the Guidelines’ Prohibitions and Restrictions on Mitigating 
Factors, FD.ORG https://www.fd.org/docs/select-topics—sentencing/no_more
_math_without_subtraction.pdf (Nov. 1, 2010).  For a discussion regarding the 
potential of mitigating factors to have a greater role in federal sentencing, see 
William W. Berry III, Mitigation in Federal Sentencing in the United States, in 
MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 2471 (Julian V. Roberts ed., 
2011). 
 154.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, FISCAL 
YEAR 2014 (2014),  available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
research-and-publications/federal-sentencing-statistics/quarterly-sentencing-
updates/USSC-2014_Quarterly_Report_Final.pdf. 
 155.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, FISCAL 
YEAR 2014 (2014),  available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
research-and-publications/federal-sentencing-statistics/quarterly-sentencing-
updates/USSC-2014_Quarterly_Report_Final.pdf. 
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While criminal history score and offense severity are 
cardinal sentencing considerations, they do not exhaust all of 
the matters that influence the penalty.  Courts can depart from 
a guideline for a number of reasons.  The most wide-ranging is 
18 U.S.C. § 3553, which, in relevant part, states: 
(a) Factors to be Considered in Imposing a Sentence—The 
court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater 
than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in 
paragraph (2) of this subsection.  The court, in determining 
the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider: 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 
history and characteristics of the defendant; 
(2) the need for the sentence imposed: 
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to 
promote respect for the law, and to provide just 
punishment for the offense; 
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal 
conduct; 
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the 
defendant; and 
(D) to provide the defendant with needed 
educational or vocational training, medical care, 
or other correctional treatment in the most 
effective manner. . .156 
The Guidelines expressly set out over three dozen 
considerations that can affect the penalty.157  They also 
prescribe several considerations that should not have an 
impact on penalty.158  In order to determine the appropriate 
guideline penalty, the courts may factor in a number of 
mitigating and aggravating considerations.  They come in two 
main forms: adjustments and departures. 
“Adjustments” are considerations that increase or 
decrease penalty by a designated amount.159  For example, a 
demonstration of remorse can result in a decrease of penalty 
 
 156.  For a discussion of the operation of this provision, see Berry, supra note 
153, at 2471; Evans & Coffins, supra note 153. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  For an historical overview of the development of aggravating and 
mitigating considerations in the Guidelines, see Evans & Coffins, supra note 153, 
at 2–6. 
 159.  These are set out in Chapter 3 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 135 at 341. 
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by up to two levels; it can increase to three levels if it is 
accompanied by an early guilty plea.160  The other main 
category of aggravating and mitigating considerations is 
known as a “departure.”161  If a departure is applicable, the 
court can more readily impose a sentence outside the 
applicable Guideline range.162  Moreover, as noted above 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553, the Guidelines permit, in rare 
instances, considerations that are not set out in the Guidelines 
to justify departing from the range.163  Thus, the range of 
aggravating and mitigating considerations set out in the 
Guidelines is not exhaustive.  Where a court departs from the 
applicable range, it is required to state its reason.164 
C. The Relevance of Substance Involvement to United 
States Sentencing 
Most importantly, for the purposes of this Article, the 
Guidelines make it clear that substance involvement should 
not ordinarily lead to a penalty reduction.  Section 5H1.4 
relevantly states: 
Drug or alcohol dependence or abuse ordinarily is not a 
reason for a downward departure.  Substance abuse is 
highly correlated to an increased propensity to commit 
crime.  Due to this increased risk, it is highly recommended 
that a defendant who is incarcerated also be sentenced to 
supervised release with a requirement that the defendant 
participate in an appropriate substance abuse program (see 
§5D1.3(d)(4)).  If participation in a substance abuse 
program is required, the length of supervised release 
should take into account the length of time necessary for 
the probation office to judge the success of the program. 
 
 160.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 135, § 3E1.1. at 460 However, § 
5K2.0(d)(4) provides that the court cannot depart from a guideline range as a 
result of “The defendant’s decision, in and of itself, to plead guilty to the offense 
or to enter a plea agreement with respect to the offense (i.e., a departure may not 
be based merely on the fact that the defendant decided to plead guilty or to enter 
into a plea agreement, but a departure may be based on justifiable, non-
prohibited reasons as part of a sentence that is recommended, or agreed to, in the 
plea agreement and accepted by the court. See §6B1.2 (Standards for Acceptance 
of Plea Agreement).” 
 161.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 135 at 457.’ 
 162.  Id. at § 1A4(b). 
 163.  Id. § 5K2.0(a)(2)(B); see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007); 
Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1247 (2011). 
 164.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 135, § 5K2.0(e).’ 
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In certain cases a downward departure may be 
appropriate to accomplish a specific treatment purpose.  In a 
case in which a defendant who is a substance abuser is 
sentenced to probation, it is strongly recommended that the 
conditions of probation contain a requirement that the 
defendant participate in an appropriate substance abuse 
program.165 
This is a softening from the initial terminology employed 
by this section.  As noted by Amy Baron-Evans and Paul Hofer, 
in its original form Section 5H1.4 stated that drug dependence 
and alcohol abuse were never a reason for imposing a sentence 
below the guideline range.166 However, there was no 
proscription on these considerations justifying an above 
guideline sentence. 
In any event, Section 5H1.4 is subject to 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a)(1).  Evans and Hofer observe that: 
. . . § 5H1.4 is not only advisory after Booker, but by its 
terms does not apply at all in determining whether to 
sentence outside the guideline range in any manner not 
designated as a “departure.” Put another way, § 3553(a) (1) 
requires the sentencing court to consider “the nature and 
circumstances of the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant,” and the statute trumps 
any guideline or policy statement to the contrary. See 
Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 44, 45 (1993); 
United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997). Indeed, 
in Gall, the Court made no mention of the Commission’s 
policy statements regarding departures, although it upheld 
a probationary sentence based on factors that are 
prohibited or deemed not ordinarily relevant by such policy 
statements.167 
There is no clear and established jurisprudence regarding 
the relevance of substance involvement which interprets and 
applies the above provisions.  In United States v. Perella, 
District Judge Gertner noted: 
 
 165.  See id. § 5B1.3(d)(4). 
 166.  Amy Baron-Evans and Paul Hofer, Litigating Mitigating Factors: 
Departures, variances, and Alternatives to Incarceration (2010, revised 2011). 
The current wording “ordinarily is not a reason for a downward departure” was 
adopted in 2010. Thus, drug and alcohol dependence has been changed from 
“prohibited category to a discouraged category, so far as mitigation is concerned.” 
Id. at 94. 
 167.  Id. 
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The status of being addicted has an ambiguous relationship 
to the defendant’s culpability. It could be a mitigating 
factor, explaining the motivation for the crime. It could be 
an aggravating factor, supporting a finding of likely 
recidivism. Barbara S. Meierhoefer, The Role of Offense 
and Offender Characteristics in Federal Sentencing, 66 S. 
Cal. L.Rev. 367, 385 (1992). On the other hand, the 
relationship between drug rehabilitation and crime is clear. 
If drug addiction creates a propensity to crime, drug 
rehabilitation goes a long way to preventing recidivism. In 
fact, statistics suggest that the rate of recidivism is less for 
drug offenders who receive treatment while in prison or jail, 
and still less for those treated outside of a prison setting.168 
In the recent case of United States v. Hendrickson,169 the 
judge reviewed scientific evidence summarizing that 
“addiction biologically robs drug abusers of their judgment, 
causing them to act impulsively and ignore the future 
consequences of their actions.”170  For the court, the available 
scientific evidence raised a “fundamental issue at sentencing: 
culpability.”171  Given that section 3553(a) promotes the goal of 
retribution, “a criminal sentence must be directly related to the 
personal culpability of the criminal offender,” and “the history 
and characteristics of the defendant” are relevant in 
establishing the culpability of the offender.”172  Therefore, in 
dealing with an addict, the court is required to ask how 
addiction affects culpability.173 
The court’s response was that in most cases addiction 
mitigates a defendant’s culpability:  
By physically hijacking the brain, addiction diminishes the 
addict’s capacity to evaluate and control his or her 
behaviors.  Rather than rationally assessing the costs of 
their actions, addicts are prone to act impulsively, without 
accurately weighing future consequences.  This is certainly 
true for Hendrickson, whose criminal history coincides 
with, and directly relates to, periods of drug abuse.  During 
allocution, . . . Hendrickson noted that “drugs clouded my 
mind and motivated me to do things I would never do had I 
 
 168.  United States v. Perella, 273 F. Supp. 2d 162, 164 (D. Mass. 2003). 
 169.  United States v. Hendrickson, 25 F. Supp. 3d 1166 (N.D. Iowa 2014). 
 170.  Id. at 1173. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. at 1174 (internal citations omitted). 
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been sober.”  Hendrickson, therefore, acknowledges that 
drugs diminished his capacity to make good decisions—
something both defense counsel and the AUSA 
acknowledge, too.174 
The judge recognized that the Sentencing Guidelines 
preclude the granting of downward departures based on the 
offender’s voluntary use of substances.  However, he negated 
the view that the use of substances was always voluntary: “The 
Guidelines . . . appear to incorporate a misinformed view of 
how addiction affects volition.”175  Nonetheless, the court made 
a distinction between departures and variances and wrote that 
it had the discretion to grant variances. 
In an interesting twist, the court analogized between 
youth and addiction as mitigating factors: “addiction is 
mitigating for much the same reasons that the United States 
Supreme Court has recognized youth is mitigating.”176  
However, addiction is not: 
limitlessly mitigating.  For example, addiction may not be 
mitigating, or may be less mitigating, where there is no 
nexus between the defendant’s addiction and offense; or 
where the defendant has had numerous opportunities for 
treatment and has either declined drug treatment or failed 
to meaningfully attempt to complete drug treatment.  Also, 
there may be some point at which a defendant no longer 
gets the “benefit” of addiction-based mitigation—like the 
defendant who, after sentencing, repeatedly violates his or 
her terms of supervised release by using drugs or alcohol.  
Addiction could even be aggravating in certain situations.  
Each case must be carefully considered on its own and all 
of the § 3553(a) factors must be balanced.177 
 
 174.  Id. at 1174. 
 175.  United States v. Hendrickson, 25 F. Supp. 3d 1166, 1174 (N.D. Iowa 
2014). 
 176.  Id. at 1175.  (“Just as there are fundamental differences between the 
juvenile and adult brain, so too are there fundamental differences between the 
addict and non-addict brain.  Because of these differences, addicts, like juveniles, 
tend to make “impetuous and ill-considered” decisions.  Thus, for the same 
reasons juveniles are generally less culpable, so too are addicts.”) 
 177.  Id. at 1173.  On the facts, the court ruled that Hendrickson’s addiction 
was mitigating:  
especially when considered together with Hendrickson’s youth.  [He] has 
been addicted to drugs since he was 14 years old.  He is now only 23 
years old.  Hendrickson has abused brain-altering drugs through most 
of the years during which his adolescent brain was still physically 
developing.  As a result, Hendrickson has sadly, but predictably, made 
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Thereafter, the court noted that “district courts may grant 
addiction-based variances for defendants who are less-than-
exceptional addicts[,]” and “need only ‘adequately explain the 
chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and 
to promote the perception of fair sentencing.’ ” 178  In the judge’s 
opinion, Hendrickson’s young age at the time he started using 
drugs and “how directly his criminal history is related to, and 
influenced by, his addiction[,]” makes the case 
“extraordinary.”179 
This case is a perfect illustration of the doctrinal 
incoherence and confusion surrounding the granting of 
mitigation in the context of substance involved offenders.  As 
the court notes, “balancing the § 3553(a) factors requires 
judges ‘to weigh that which cannot be measured.’ ” 180  
Indicating the level of disharmony in the case law, some courts 
have held that alcohol addiction is a disease, that such 
addiction is a “weak mitigating factor”,181 that rather than 
 
poor decisions based on impulse and immaturity. Letters from 
Hendrickson’s family members . . . confirm this.  Id. 
 178.  Id. at 1178 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007)). 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Id. at 1179 (quoting Guido Calabresi, What Makes a Judge Great: To A. 
Leon Higginbotham, Jr., 142 U. PA. L.REV. 513, 513 (1993)) (“I acknowledge—
as § 3553(a)(5) requires me to—that the Guidelines disfavor addiction-based 
departures. . . . Although “the Guidelines should be the starting point and the 
initial benchmark” for a defendant’s sentence, . . . they are ultimately “merely 
persuasive authority.” . . . And while I must consider Guidelines policy 
statements under § 3553(a)(5), they are only one of the § 3553(a) factors I must 
consider in deciding whether to grant a variance. Where § 3553(a)(5) weighs 
against addiction-based variances, § 3553(a)(1) weighs in favor of them. . . . I 
consider the mitigating effects of addiction under § 3553(a)(1) to far outweigh any 
advisory policy statements under § 3553(a)(5). I therefore conclude that 
Hendrickson’s history of addiction justifies a downward variance here”) (internal 
citations omitted).  Id. 
 181.  Campbell v. Bradshaw, 674 F.3d 578, 597–98 (2012)  (“Voluntary 
intoxication under Ohio law is—at most—a “weak mitigating factor.” . . . To 
distinguish this black letter law, Campbell argues that he did not seek to 
introduce evidence of voluntary intoxication as a stand-alone factor, but rather to 
show its “synergistic effect” on his behavior and his resultant “rage reaction.”  
And he relies upon State v. Haight, 98 Ohio App. 3d 639, 649 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) 
to show that intoxication can be given “significant” weight.  But Haight is an 
intermediate appellate court decision, followed by at least eight decisions of the 
Ohio Supreme Court holding that voluntary intoxication merits little weight in 
mitigation. . . . And Campbell cites to no case apart from Haight to support his 
theory that intoxication should be treated with significant mitigating weight 
(with or without a “synergistic effect” on other factors relevant to Campbell’s 
case).  Further, the Ohio Supreme Court has upheld a death sentence where the 
defendant consumed drugs and more alcohol than Campbell prior to the 
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being a mitigating factor it might instead be an aggravating 
factor,182 and alcohol and drug abuse by the offender is not a 
mitigating factor.183 
Survey data suggests that many judges believe substance 
abuse should impact sentencing.  In fact 49% of judges have 
stated that they believe that drug dependence is “ordinarily 
relevant” to the reducing of a penalty and a similar portion 
(47%) formed the same view about alcohol dependence.184  The 
practice, however, is to the contrary. 
Drug dependence and substance abuse is not regularly 
cited as a reason for a reduced sentence.  In 2014, sentences 
were handed down in 75,836 federal cases.  Drug dependence 
or alcohol abuse was cited as a reason to impose a sentence 
below the guideline range under § 3553(a) in only 423 cases.185  
In addition to this, there were twenty-seven straight 
departures.186  Thus, substance abuse impacts penalty in less 
than 1% of cases. 
Sentencing law in the United States is not uniform and 
each state has different aggravating and mitigating factors.  
This includes the approach to substance involvement.  The 
 
commission of the crime, and where the defendant had also been diagnosed with 
alcohol dependence and a personality disorder.”) 
 182.  United States v. Sogan, 388 Fed. Appx. 521, 524–25 (2010).  
 183.  United States v. Estrada, 425 Fed. Appx. 390, 391 (2011)  (“The district 
court did not fail to consider Cortez’s drug and alcohol abuse; rather, it explained 
that it did not regard such abuse to be a mitigating factor.  Because of Cortez’s 
mendacity and extensive and violent criminal history, the court stated, a non-
Guidelines sentence was necessary to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to 
promote respect for the law, to deter future criminal conduct, to protect the public 
from further crimes, and to provide just punishment for the offense.  The district 
court’s reasons were adequate.”) 
 184.  Evans & Hofer, supra note 166, at 48. 
 185.  2014 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, UNITED STATES 
SENTENCING COMM’N, http://www.ussc.gov/research-and-publications/annual-
reports-sourcebooks/2014/sourcebook-2014 (last visited Aug. 25, 2015) (Tables 
25A & 25B).  These are described as cases “Downward Departures with Booker 
and 18 U.S.C. § 3553” and consist of “cases with a sentence below the guideline 
range that include both a departure (see Downward Departure From Guideline 
Range) as well as a sentence outside the guideline system mentioning either 
Booker; 18 U.S.C. § 3553; or related factors as a reason for sentencing below the 
guideline range.” 
 186.  Id. at Table 25A, where these cases are described as “Downward 
Departure From Guideline Range Downward Departure From Guideline Range” 
and which consist of cases “with departures below the guideline range that do not 
cite as a reason either Booker; 18 U.S.C. § 3553; or factors or reasons specifically 
prohibited in the provisions, policy statements, or commentary of the federal 
guidelines manual.” 
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divergence is illustrated by comparing the relevance of 
substance abuse to sentencing in the four largest states 
(California, Texas, Florida, and New York).  In California, 
substance involvement is not of itself an aggravating187 or 
mitigating factor.188  However, under the California Rules of 
Court, Rule 4.423 substance involvement can indirectly be 
relevant to other sentencing considerations.  Rule 4.423(b)(2) 
states, as a mitigating factor, “[t]he defendant was suffering 
from a mental or physical condition that significantly reduced 
culpability for the crime.”189  “Under the former California 
Rules of Court, a sentencing court could consider any mental 
or physical factor that, while not amounting to a defense of the 
crime, might serve to reduce the defendant’s culpability,”190 
which may be construed as the defendant being substance 
involved at the time of the offense.191 
In Texas, the second largest state192, “evidence may be 
offered by the state and the defendant as to any matter the 
court deems relevant to sentencing, including, but not limited 
to: the prior criminal record of the defendant, his general 
reputation, his character, opinion evidence and the 
circumstances of the offense.”193  Further, the court violates 
due process of law if it assesses a predetermined sentence, 
“arbitrarily refuses to consider the entire punishment range, 
or refuses to consider mitigating evidence when determining 
punishment.”194  Accordingly, there is some scope for 
incorporating substance involvement into sentencing 
determinations. 
The third largest state,195 Florida, permits departures 
 
 187.  CAL. R. OF CT. 4.421. 
 188.  CAL. R. OF CT. 4.423. 
 189.  CAL. R. OF CT. 4.423(b)(2). 
 190.  Jahad, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33868, at 72. 
 191.  CAL. R. OF CT. 4.423(b)(2); Jahad v. Hernandez, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
33868. 
 192.  See, e.g., Florida Passes New York to Become the Nation’s Third Most 
Populous State, US CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.census.gov/
newsroom/press-releases/2014/cb14-232.html. 
 193.  TX. CODE OF CRIM. P., Art. 37.07, § 3(a)(1). 
 194.  See McClenan v. State, 661 S.W.2d 108, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983), 
overruled on other grounds, De Leon v. Aguilar, 127 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2004); Buerger v. State, 60 S.W.3d 358, 364 (Tex. App., Houston 14th Dist. 2001, 
pet. ref’d); Cole v. State, 931 S.W.2d 578, 579–80 (Tex. App. Dallas 1995, pet. 
ref’d). 
 195.  See, e.g., Florida Passes New York to Become the Nation’s Third Most 
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from the sentencing guidelines in certain situations but these 
do not extend to substance involvement.  Regarding mitigating 
circumstances, “any downward departure from the lowest 
permissible sentence, as calculated by the total sentence points 
pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 921.0024, is prohibited unless certain 
circumstances justify the downward departure.”196  
Circumstances or factors that can be considered include, those 
listed in Fla. Stat. § 921.0026(2).  Florida lists: “the capacity of 
the defendant to appreciate the criminal nature of the conduct 
or to conform that conduct to the requirements of law was 
substantially impaired” as one of the non-exclusive mitigating 
factors supporting departure from the guidelines.197  However, 
subsection (3) of the statute states, “the defendant’s substance 
abuse or addiction, including intoxication at the time of the 
offense, is not a mitigating factor under subsection (2) and does 
not, under any circumstances, justify a downward departure 
from the permissible sentencing range.”198 
In New York, the fourth largest state,199 substance 
involvement is a sentencing consideration in a number of 
circumstances.  For example, where a defendant is charged 
with first-degree murder, New York law recognizes, as an 
affirmative defense, “that ‘the defendant acted under the 
influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there 
was a reasonable explanation or excuse’. . . and while 
‘intoxication is not, as such, a defense to a criminal charge,’ in 
all criminal prosecutions the defendant may offer evidence of 
intoxication ‘whenever it is relevant to negative an element of 
the crime charged.’ ” 200  “Under most circumstances, killings 
that are a product of mental or emotional disturbance, or that 
are committed by defendants under the influence of alcohol or 
 
Populous State, US CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.census
.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2014/cb14-232.html. 
 196.  FL. CRIM. PUNISHMENT CODE, available at 
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/sen_cpcm/cpc_manual.pdf. 
 197.  FLA. STAT. § 921.0026(2)(c). 
 198.  FLA. STAT. § 921.0026(3). 
 199.  See, e.g., Florida Passes New York to Become the Nation’s Third Most 
Populous State, US CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.
census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2014/cb14-232.html. 
 200.  James R. Acker, When the Cheering Stopped: An Overview and Analysis 
of New York’s Death Penalty Legislation, 17 Pace L. Rev. 41 (1996) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
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another drug, will not be affected by these formal rules.”201  
“New York’s mitigating factor more broadly applies when the 
offender was ‘under the influence’ of alcohol or another drug, 
and it does not require specific impairment of the defendant’s 
cognitive or volitional capacities.”202  More specifically, for first-
degree murder, mitigating factors include: “the murder was 
committed while the defendant was mentally or emotionally 
disturbed or under the influence of alcohol or any drug, 
although not to such an extent as to constitute a defense to 
prosecution”203 
D. Summary of the Relevance of Substance Involvement to 
Sentencing 
In summary, the existing approach to the relevance of 
substance involvement to sentencing can be set out in the 
following eight propositions: 
1. There is no clearly established theory or approach 
regarding the relevance of substance involvement 
to sentencing; 
2. In both the United States and Australia, substance 
involvement can be a neutral factor, or it can 
increase sentence length or reduce the penalty; 
3. Pursuant to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
there is considerable scope for substance 
involvement to mitigate penalty but this occurs in 
less than one percent of cases; 
4. In Australia and some jurisdictions in the United 
States, substance involvement can aggravate 
penalty when an offender commits a crime while 
intoxicated, and it is foreseeable that this state 
would result in him or her committing a crime; 
5. In Australia, substance involvement can also 
aggravate penalty where it enhances the prospect 
of recidivism; 
6. Substance abuse can mitigate penalty where the 
offender sells drugs to obtain money to feed a drug 
habit, but there is no mitigation where the offender 
commits a robbery to obtain money to purchase 
 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 400.27(9)(e) (McKinney 1996); Acker, supra note 200, 
at 118 n.329. 
 203.  N.Y. CRIM. PROC. §400.27 (McKinney 1996). 
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drugs to sustain a drug habit; 
7. In Australia and some states in the United States, 
intoxication also reduces penalty where it caused 
the offender to act out of character, or the substance 
abuse was supposedly not willed because the habit 
was in response to an unfavorable life event; and 
8. In Australia and some parts of the United States, 
substance involvement can also mitigate penalty 
when the prospects of rehabilitation are enhanced 
by a reduced sentence. 
III. EVALUATION OF THE EXISTING LAW 
As we have seen, there are no clear principles regarding 
the manner in which substance involvement should be 
incorporated into the sentencing calculus.  The greatly 
divergent responses to the issue demonstrate a lack of 
doctrinal and jurisprudential clarity.  This part of the Article 
attempts to establish clear-cut guiding principles in this area. 
The starting point is to evaluate the validity of the reasons 
that have been provided by the courts for according substance 
use relevance in the sentencing calculus.  We start with the 
supposed connection between substance involvement and 
culpability. 
A. Drug Use as Going to Culpability is Irrelevant – Either 
as Mitigating or Aggravating 
As noted above, substance use can lead to either increased 
or diminished culpability, with the sentence being increased or 
reduced accordingly.  The main circumstance in which 
intoxication is regarded as increasing culpability is where the 
offender is aware (from previous experience) that it will 
increase the chance of him or her engaging in criminal conduct.  
Decreased culpability can occur where the offender commenced 
drug use for reasons that were not totally the free choice of the 
offender or where intoxication causes the offender to act out of 
character. 
This area of the law is confusing and made obscure by the 
fact that there are a plethora of vague and unclear concepts, 
standards and tests.  It is not clear, for example, what degree 
of foreseeability an offender must have in order for substance 
abuse to aggravate penalty based on previous misconduct 
while intoxicated, or what types of life events are so traumatic 
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that a person is supposedly compelled to commence using 
drugs or alcohol. 
The most complex inquiry relating to the relevance of 
substance involvement to sentencing concerns the extent to 
which offenders are responsible for their use and abuse of 
drugs.  This has resulted in fierce debate among Australian 
judges.204  Some judges have held that offenders are fully 
responsible for their decision to commence using drugs and 
ongoing choices relating to their conduct while intoxicated.205  
By contrast, other judges have taken the diametrically 
opposite view, stating that drug use is often a matter compelled 
on offenders.206 
Ascertaining the correct position in this regard, either 
generally or in relation to specific offenders, is complex because 
at the scientific level of learning and understanding the extent 
to which illicit drugs and alcohol actually grip and drive 
human behavior is not well advanced.207  Further, resolution of 
the competing approaches to substance involvement and 
sentencing often leads into an intellectual journey into 
philosophical theories pertaining to human free-will; the 
nature of self-determination and our capacity to make choices 
which are genuinely free and questions relating to 
determinism.208 
At the extremes, there are situations when choice can be 
so influenced that we are sure that it is either free or not free.  
A person who “chooses” to commit a crime when a gun is held 
at his or her head is not responsible for committing the crime, 
but one who assaults his or her neighbor under the threat of 
being removed as a Facebook friend is fully responsible for the 
crime.209  But often the situation is not so clear cut.  Such is the 
 
 204.  See Part II(A) of this Article. 
 205.  See Part II(A) of this Article. 
 206.  See Part II(A) of this Article. 
 207.  See discussion of the Hendrickson case, supra note 169. 
 208.  For an overview of the relevant philosophical issues, see Robert Young, 
The Implications of Determinism, in A Companion to Ethics 534 (Peter Singer 
ed., 1991)  (explaining that deterministic theory states that all human action is 
causally determined); see also Stephen J. Morse, Severe Environmental 
Deprivation (aka RSB): A Tragedy, Not a Defense, 2 Ala. C.R. & C.L. L. Rev. 147, 
149 (2011)  (“[I]f causation or determinism per se were an excuse, no one would 
ever be responsible for any behavior.”). 
 209.  The defence of duress is recognised in most all jurisdictions, see Alan 
Reed and Michael Bohlander, General Defences in the Criminal Law: Domestic 
and Comparative Perspectives, 106–07  (2014) . 
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case relating to offenses committed by people who are 
intoxicated at the time of the offense. 
As it transpires, both the scientific and philosophical 
issues are, to a large degree, a distraction in the context of the 
relevance of substance involvement to sentencing.  This is 
because the variable in the sentencing calculus which these 
issues relate to (culpability) is not highly important. 
Criminal law, by its nature, is focused on prohibiting the 
commission of acts which are harmful to individuals or the 
community more widely.  Criminal law is society’s strongest 
form of condemnation and the forum in which we act most 
coercively against individuals.210  Ultimately, the criminal law 
aims to prohibit and punish conduct which harms the interests 
of others.211  It is focused on preventing bad deeds, not bad 
intentions or thoughts. 
In order for criminal responsibility to occur, it is necessary 
for the inappropriate mental state to result in conduct which 
harms another person or the community.212  To the extent that 
mental states are relevant, it is primarily because there is 
generally a strong link between them and actions.  Thus, some 
emphasis is attached to mental states by our legal system.  In 
particular, in criminal law, a distinction is drawn between 
mental states in the form of intent, recklessness, and 
negligence.213  However, these thought processes are not 
 
 210.  ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 16 (2d ed., 1995); 
Donoso, Alfonso L (2010), The Criminal Law of the Free Society: A Philosophical 
Exploration of Overcriminalization and the Limits of the Criminal Law. PhD 
thesis, University of York, 2, http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/1453/1/PhD
Thesis.pdf (“The criminal law is the most coercive institution of social control in 
the modern liberal state. It criminalizes conduct, prosecutes individuals, and 
treats offenders in ways that under other circumstance we would consider as 
serious violations of individuals’ rights.”). 
 211.  See, e.g., JAN GORECKI, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 33–38 (1979). 
 212.  Mirko Bagaric, Punishment and Sentencing: a Rational Approach (2001); 
1 Wharton’s Criminal Law § 27 (15th ed.) (“In the ordinary case, an evil deed, 
without more, does not constitute a crime; a crime is committed only if the evil 
doer harbored an evil mind.”). 
 213.  See, e.g., Darryl Brown, Federal Mens Rea Interpretation and the Limits 
of Culpability’s Relevance, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 109 (2012).  To the 
extent that culpability is important role in the criminal law, this is already often 
factored into offence classification.  Thus, some offense types are broken down 
according to the mental state of the offender, for example whether the outcome of 
the crime was intended or the offender was merely reckless or negligent as to the 
eventual outcome. It is for this reason that, for example, murder is a more serious 
crime than voluntary manslaughter.  However, it is important that culpability 
beyond offence classification should not considerably be double counted in the 
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intrinsically important.  They are only of instrumental 
significance because they are regarded as inciting conduct.214  
Intent is more culpable than either recklessness or negligence, 
simply because intentional acts have a higher probability of 
achieving their stated objective than reckless or negligent 
acts.215  
No matter how incorrigibly wicked a person may be, or 
how resolutely he or she may intend that a certain harmful 
state of affairs should eventuate, no legal responsibility is 
ascribed until, and unless, such mental states are accompanied 
by actions.216 
Accordingly, the thought and evaluative process that 
culminates in committing crime is a distant second-order 
consideration to the level of harm that is caused by the crime.  
The fact that some individuals have less capacity for clear 
thought, and a judgment deficit, does not make their actions 
less harmful.  Neither does it diminish their criminal 
responsibility—at its highest, it merely diminishes their level 
of blameworthiness. 
Therefore, while intoxication and addiction can vary 
considerably in nature, intensity, and impact,217 given that 
ultimately the thought process that underpins a crime is not a 
cardinal consideration so far as the criminal law is concerned, 
there is limited utility in trying to ascertain precisely the 
degree and nature of the level of intoxication and the way in 
which curtails genuinely free decision-making.  Culpability (as 
opposed to responsibility) is only a minor consideration in 
criminal law, so it is not highly productive to inquire deeply 
 
determination of the ultimate penalty. 
 214.  See id. at 109–10. 
 215.  See, e.g., id. (discussing “proportionate culpability”). 
 216.  The key exception to this is the law relating to attempted criminal 
offenses.  However, even here the degree of intrusion into the principle that 
intentions are per se irrelevant is marginal.  For liability to occur, it is necessary 
for the offender to possess the requisite mental state, and to perform actions 
which constitute a substantial step towards completing the offense.  For an 
overview, see Mail and Wire Fraud: An Abridged Overview of Federal Criminal 
Law, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 10 (July 21, 2011), available at 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41931.pdf.  Another exception is the offense of 
conspiracy, but again this also requires the commission of overt acts—though 
they need to constitute the completed offense.  See id. 
 217.  See Jamie Walvisch, Sentencing Offenders with Impaired Mental 
Functioning: Developing Australia’s “Most Sophisticated and Subtle” Analysis, 17 
PSYCHOL., PSYCHIATRY & L. 1, 5 (2010). 
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into how any individual fares against this standard.  In crude 
terms, culpability is only an approximately 10 to 25% variable 
consideration in the evaluation of the seriousness of a crime.218  
This, of course, is not a totally insignificant consideration and 
could in some cases mean the difference between a short term 
of imprisonment, lesser sanction (such as probation), or a 
reduction of months or years of a prison sentence. 
However, in order to enliven the culpability element, it is 
necessary to establish (as opposed to simply theorizing)219 that 
substance involvement either increases or decreases personal 
blameworthiness.220  It is here that the argument again falls 
short. 
The most compelling argument for conferring a discount to 
substance involved offenders is when the offender commenced 
using substances in response to a life trauma.  There is an 
instinctive sympathy that is accorded to people that have 
experienced and suffered tragic events.  However, this should 
not necessarily lead to a discounted sentence.  There are an 
infinite number and type of events that cause distress to 
people.  The impact of the events is determined by the objective 
deprivation involved and the level of resilience of the 
individual.  The trajectory of the response to the trauma that 
follows the event does not have a defined path.  Painful life 
experiences do not foreclose choice.  Certainly, negative life 
events can incline people towards self-destructive behavior, 
including an increased tendency to consume drugs and 
alcohol,221 but for most people hardship is dealt with by other 
means.222  It can even inspire some people to greater efforts and 
higher achievements.  Most people who experience trauma in 
their lives do not resort to substances to assist them to cope 
with it.223  And certainly, there is no scientific evidence that life 
 
 218.  See Mirko Bagaric, Injecting Content into the Mirage that is 
Proportionality in Sentencing, 25 NEW ZEALAND UNIV. L. REV. 411 (2013). 
 219. In any legal proceeding, including sentencing proceedings, the obligation 
is on the party to ascertain a proposition to establish its validity. 
 220.  Or that it is relevant to some other sentencing objective, such as 
rehabilitation—this is discussed shortly. 
 221.  See, e.g., Making the Connection: Trauma and Substance Abuse, THE 
NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS NETWORK (June 2008), available at 
http://www.nctsn.org/sites/default/files/assets/pdfs/SAToolkit_1.pdf. 
 222.  As noted above, most people do not have substance abuse problems. 
 223.  See generally Lamya Khoury et al., Substance use, Childhood Traumatic 
Experience, and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in an Urban Civilian Population, 
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trauma invariably leads to substance abuse.224 
Once people start using drugs, developments in 
neuroscience suggest that the addiction is stronger than may 
have initially been thought.  It is well-established that the 
brain becomes dependent on drugs, such that stopping drug 
use can cause severe negative effects.  Emerging evidence 
suggests that cravings do not stem merely from a desire to 
avoid the physical effects of withdrawal, but instead the brain 
becomes dependent on chemicals which are contained in the 
drug.225  “It is precisely because the brain chemistry changes 
that it is so challenging for an addict to stop using drugs.”226  
Further, addiction to drugs results in diminished inhibition 
and ability to control impulses.227  While it is now clear that 
addiction has both physical and cerebral effects, the science in 
this area is not fully developed, and certainly there is no 
compelling evidence to suggest that drug users are driven to 
crime with a strong degree of inevitability.  For individuals 
that commence using substances, the choice remains of how 
this use will impact their conduct.  It can be self-regarding or 
harmful to others.  To this end, at the extremes is the 
individual who drinks him or herself to sleep every night, and 
the person who commits armed robberies to feed a heroin 
habit.  Accordingly, the nexus between substance abuse and 
crime, while statistically meaningful, is not automated or pre-
determined and does not undercut the fact that all persons 
have a genuine choice regarding the decision to commence 
substance use.  Thus, the scientific point of reference does not 
compel mitigation for substance involved offenders. 
The weakness of the proposition that addicted offenders 
who sell drugs to sustain their habit should get a discount is 
 
27 DEPRESSION AND ANXIETY (2010). 
 224.  TRAUMA AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND 
TREATMENT OF COMORBID DISORDERS  (Pamela Brown & Paige Quimette eds., 
2003). 
 225.  David Eagleman et al., Why Neuroscience Matters for Rational Drug 
Policy, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 7, 17 (2010). 
 226.  Roger Przybylski, Correctional and Sentencing Reform for Drug 
Offenders, COLORADO CRIM. JUSTICE REFORM COALITION 15 (Sept. 2009), 
available at http://ccjrc.org/pdf/Correctional_and_Sentencing_Reform_for_Drug_
Offenders.pdf; Drugs, Brains and Behavior, The Science of Addiction, NATIONAL 
INSTITUTE OF HEALTH, http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugs-brains-
behavior-science-addiction/preface (last updated July 2014). 
 227.  Przybylski, supra note 226, at 15. 
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supported by the fact that a discount is not accorded to addicts 
who commit other forms of crime, such as robbery, in order to 
feed their habit.  If addiction to drugs should partially excuse 
behavior designed to sustain the habit, it should apply to all 
forms of conduct, not just to drug related crime. 
The upshot of this is that existing mitigation that is 
sometimes accorded to substance involved offenders on the 
basis of reduced culpability should be abolished.  This applies 
most clearly in circumstances where the offender commits an 
offense while intoxicated and supposedly acts out of character.  
It also applies when offenders commit crime in order to feed a 
drug habit.  The one category of people who are not responsible 
for their substance choices is children.  They should be given 
considerable mitigation for their substance involved actions.228 
This principle and approach is already accommodated within 
the sentencing law of most jurisdictions, whereby 
rehabilitation is the principal objective of sentencing,229 and 
does not have implications for the sentencing of adults. 
It follows that there is no clear-cut basis for asserting that 
the circumstances relating to substance involvement are so 
powerful or directive so as to either negate any genuine level 
of choice, or to make criminal behavior very likely.  The current 
state of learning regarding the impact of illicit drugs and 
alcohol is too embryonic for firm conclusions to be made 
regarding the extent to which substances influence decision-
making; and especially the extent to which orthodox 
understandings of free-will should be revisited or revised.  
Thus, issues of culpability should be eliminated from the 
sentencing inquiry so far as substance involvement is 
concerned. 
While substance involvement should not mitigate penalty, 
neither should it aggravate the sanction.  The principle that 
intoxication should increase penalty where it was foreseeable 
that the offender may act inappropriately while intoxicated is, 
as we have seen, poorly developed and unclear in its scope.  The 
principle is also doctrinally flawed.  The motivations and 
reasons for committing crime are infinite, and intoxication can 
be one trigger.  Others include anger, greed, revenge, lust, or 
 
 228.  The science relating to the lack offformation of the child brain is 
discussed in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) 
 229.  BAGARIC & EDNEY, supra note 45. 
2_BAGARIC FINAL 3/25/2016  9:44 AM 
2016] SUBSTANCE ABUSE & CRIME 291 
sheer opportunism or malice.  All of these motivations are 
negative sentiments.  They are negative because they 
sometimes result in individuals performing harmful acts.  
There is no tenable way to rank these negative sentiments.  
They are all regrettable.  For example, a rape stemming from 
sheer lust is no more or less bad than one that is alcohol fueled.  
Sure, intoxication may cause some offenders to commit more 
extreme forms of crime, but so too can other motivators such 
as revenge and rage.  In each case, the cardinal determinant of 
offense severity is the harm caused by the crime.  The view that 
intoxicated criminal acts are worse than other forms of crime 
requires courts to engage in an impossible and non-existent 
comparison and ranking of the degrees of inappropriateness 
associated with mental states that underpin criminal acts.  
This approach should be rejected. 
B. Substance Involvement, Rehabilitation, and 
Recidivism 
Rehabilitation is the process of inducing internal 
attitudinal reform in offenders so they become more law-
abiding.230  It is normally regarded as a basis for reducing 
penalty severity.231  Intuitively, intoxicated offenders seem 
more salvageable than other offenders.  In simplistic terms, the 
view is that if the offender is taken away from the drink or drug 
then he or she will reform.  In order for this objective to 
mitigate penalty, it must be established that there are effective 
and efficient programs which reduce recidivism rates for 
substance involved offenders. 
The effectiveness of the criminal justice system to elicit 
internal behavioral reform in offenders is much in doubt.  
Following extensive research conducted between 1960 and 
1974, Robert Martinson, in an influential article, concluded 
that empirical studies had not established that any 
rehabilitative programs had worked in reducing recidivism.232  
The Panel of the National Research Council in the United 
States, several years after this work, also noted that there were 
 
 230.  Theo Alexander & Mirko Bagaric, Specific Deterrence Doesn’t Work, 
Rehabilitation Might and What it Means for Sentencing 35 CRIM. L.J. 159 (2012). 
 231.  Id. 
 232.  R. M. Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers about Prison 
Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22, 25 (1974). 
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no significant differences between the subsequent recidivism 
rates of offenders regardless of the form of punishment.  They 
concluded, “[t]his suggests that neither rehabilitative nor 
criminogenic effects operate very strongly.”233 
Recent evidence is generally more positive.  While there 
are currently no programs developed that successfully reduce 
reoffending for all types of offenses, a number of more recent 
studies have noted some success in relation to treatments and 
programs focusing on substance involved offenders.234 
The Federal Bureau of Prisons Annual Report on 
Substance Abuse Treatment Programs for the 2012 fiscal year 
states that its drug treatment programs are designed to accord 
with the best evidence-based practices.235  They are broadly 
divided into residential based treatments (i.e., for inmates) and 
non-residential treatments.236  The Report notes that an 
analysis of the residential program revealed that the 
recidivism rate for offenders that completed the program was 
15% less compared to inmates who did not complete the 
program.237  Slightly higher levels of success were observed in 
relation to female offenders.  The report, in relevant part, 
states: 
male participants were 16% less likely to recidivate and 
15% less likely to relapse than similarly-situated inmates 
who do not participate in residential drug abuse treatment 
for up to 3 years after release.  The analysis also found that 
female inmates who participate in [the treatment program] 
are 18% less likely to recidivate than similarly situated 
female inmates who do not participate in treatment.238 
The success of substance abuse interventions in the 
criminal justice system is also illustrated by the workings of 
drug courts.  They were first established in Florida in 1989 and 
 
 233.  See DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF 
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 66 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978). 
 234.  For an overview, see Elizabeth Drake et al., Evidence-Based Public Policy 
Options to Reduce Crime and Criminal Justice Costs: Implications in Washington 
State, WASH. ST. INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y (2009). 
 235.  THE FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS ANNUAL REPORT ON SUBSTANCE ABUSE 
TREATMENT PROGRAMS FISCAL YEAR 2012, REPORT TO THE JUDICIARY COMM. 
UNITED STATES CONG. (Dec. 2012).  https://www.bop.gov/inmates/custody
_and_care/docs/annual_report_fy_2012.pdf (Last visited 23 July 2015). 
 236.  Id. at 3. 
 237.  Id. at 7. 
 238.  Id. at 7; see also FY 2014 PERFORMANCE BUDGET: SALARIES AND 
EXPENSES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 29 (2014). 
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now there are over 2,000 drugs courts in the United States, 
operating in every state.239  The jurisdiction of drug courts is 
generally confined to defendants who are substance involved 
at the time of the offense and are charged with drug possession 
or other non-violent offenses.240  For some drug courts it is also 
a requirement that defendants do not have a conviction for an 
earlier violent offense.241  The normal sanction imposed by a 
drug court is a treatment program which lasts between six to 
twelve months and part of the program requires offenders to 
remain drug free.242 Offenders who do not successfully 
complete the program face the prospect of imprisonment.243  A 
recent wide-ranging analysis of the outcomes from drug courts 
notes the following positive outcomes: 
• an analysis of research findings from 76 drug courts 
found a 10% reduction in re-arrest; 
• an analysis of 30 drug court evaluations found an 
average 13% decline in the rate of reconvictions for 
a new offense; 
• a meta-analysis of 57 studies estimated that 
participation in a drug court program would 
produce an 8% decline in crime relative to no 
treatment; and 
• a Government Accountability Office report found 
that 13 of 17 courts reporting on post-program 
recidivism measured reductions between 4 and 25 
percentage points in rearrests and reconvictions.244 
While these figures are ostensibly impressive, there is a 
need to approach them with some caution, given that the 
offender cohort derives from a relatively small category of 
offending types and does not include the most serious type of 
offenders.245 
Australian studies have noted similar, albeit guarded, 
 
 239.  Behind Bars II supra note 14, at 80. 
 240.  Ryan S. King & Jill Pasquarella, Drug Courts: A Review of the Evidence, 
The Sentencing PROJECT 3 (Apr. 2009).  http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc
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 241.  Id. 
 242.  Id at 4. 
 243.  Id. 
 244.  Id. at 5 ; see Behind Bars II, supra note 14, at 80-81; Elizabeth Drake et 
al., supra note 234 (noting that drug courts reduce the recidivism of offenders by 
about 8.7%). 
 245.  See King & Pasquarella, supra note 240, at 7. 
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success regarding drug and alcohol treatment programs.  The 
most recent wide-ranging Australian study regarding the 
effectiveness of rehabilitation is a report by Karen Heseltine, 
Andrew Day, and Rick Sarre for the Australian Institute of 
Criminology, published in 2011.246  The report focused on 
changes and improvements to prison based correction 
rehabilitation programs in the custodial environment since 
2004, when the previous report was issued.247 
The report by Heseltine et al., while unable to evaluate the 
effectiveness of rehabilitation programs currently operating in 
Australian prisons, summarized recent cross-jurisdictional 
studies into the effectiveness of certain rehabilitation 
programs.248  It noted that while there were mixed results, 
there were some programs that reported positive outcomes.249  
This included drug and alcohol programs which have been 
shown to be effective at reducing substance abuse and 
reoffending.250 
This assessment is consistent with the findings of Ojmarrh 
Mitchell, David B. Wilson, and Doris L. MacKenzie, who 
undertook a major analysis of studies into the effectiveness of 
drug treatment programs in prison.251  The studies they 
focused on related to drug users and compared reoffending 
patterns of offenders who completed a drug rehabilitation 
program with those who did not complete a program, or 
completed only a minimum program between the years 1980 
and 2004.252  They analyzed sixty-six studies in total.  The 
report concluded, “overall, this meta-analytic synthesis of 
evaluations of incarceration based drug treatment programs 
found that such programs are modestly effective in reducing 
recidivism.”253  Moreover, it noted that programs that dealt 
 
 246.  See generally Karen Heseltine et al., Prison-based Correctional Offender 
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with the multiple problems of drug users (termed therapeutic 
communities) were the most successful, whereas there was no 
evidence to support good outcomes associated with “boot camp” 
programs.254 
Thus, appropriately adapted programs can reduce the 
reoffending rate of some substance involved offenders.  But this 
does not provide a basis for reducing the severity of the 
penalties imposed on such offenders.  There are two reasons.  
First, the effectiveness of rehabilitation programs is similar 
whether administered in a custodial setting or outside the 
confines of prison walls.255 
Second, while rehabilitation works in relation to some 
substance involved offenders, it is ineffective in relation to 
most of them—as we have seen it does not work in relation to 
most of such offenders.  This is especially pertinent given that 
substance involved offenders have a considerably higher 
recidivism rate than other offenders.  In one wide-ranging 
study, it was noted that slightly more than half (52%) of 
substance involved inmates in the United States have been 
incarcerated previously, compared to less than one-third (31%) 
of inmates who are not substance involved.256 
Thus, substance involved offenders reoffend at nearly 
double the rate of other offenders.  This fact significantly 
undermines the argument in favor of reducing the penalties for 
this cohort of offenders in order to pursue the objective of 
rehabilitation. 
While some treatment programs are effective at reducing 
the recidivism rate of substance involved offenders, this 
observation largely loses its significance once it is noted that 
overall substance involved offenders have a far higher 
recidivism—offenders who are not substance involved are far 
less likely to reoffend even if one takes into account the success 
of drug and alcohol treatment programs.  In crude terms, given 
that substance involved offenders are twice as likely to 
reoffend, a 20% reduction in their reoffending level still makes 
 
 254.  Id. at 6. 
 255.  Karen Heseltine et al., supra note 246; Behind Bars II:, supra note 14, at 
85 (noting that there are even higher levels of success with prison-based 
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them a far higher risk to the community than other offending.  
The risk that a substance involved offender presents to the 
community following the successful completion of a 
rehabilitation program is often still higher than that presented 
by a non-substance involved offender. 
Accordingly, none of the orthodox or existing reasons that 
have been offered for factoring in substance involvement into 
the sentencing calculus are persuasive.  This does not, 
however, entail that the link between substance involvement 
and crime should be ignored.  We now discuss the appropriate 
response. 
IV. REFORM PROPOSAL  
Before setting out reform proposals, we provide a brief 
overview of the above discussion and analysis.  There is a 
strong connection between substance involvement and 
offending.  Most people who commit crimes are substance 
involved, and nearly half of offenders are intoxicated at the 
time of the offense.  Additionally, nearly one-fifth of crimes are 
committed in order to obtain money or property to feed a drug 
habit.  Given the statistical link between alcohol, illicit drugs, 
and crime, there is a tendency to incorporate this into the 
sentencing calculus, either by punishing substance involved 
offenders more harshly because of the predictability between 
substance use and crime, or punishing them less because 
substances supposedly reduce culpability.  The prospect of 
rehabilitating substance involved offenders is also sometimes 
provided as a reason mitigating the penalties of such offenders.  
Doctrinal clarity and the relevant empirical evidence suggest, 
however, that generally no accommodation should be made for 
substance involvement in the sentencing calculus. 
It is undeniable that there is a strong link between 
substance involvement and criminal offending.  But a 
statistical association between two matters does not 
necessitate a response.  There is a stronger link between 
gender and crime than drugs and crime.  Males comprise more 
than 90% of all detainees in United States prisons and hence 
are grossly represented in the criminal justice statistics.257  Yet 
there is nothing to suggest that being a male should mitigate 
 
 257.  See E. Ann Carson, supra note 145 at 2. 
2_BAGARIC FINAL 3/25/2016  9:44 AM 
2016] SUBSTANCE ABUSE & CRIME 297 
(or aggravate) penalty.  Statistical links are no more than that: 
numbers establishing an association between events and 
circumstances.  Once the link is established, it is important to 
analyze with reference to the relevant doctrinal and scientific 
principles in the field whether any response is appropriate in 
relation to the link.  And it is from this perspective that the 
link between sentencing and substance involvement 
evaporates. 
As we have seen, the ultimate objective of criminal law is 
to prevent, or at least reduce, harmful acts being committed.  
The operative and core focus is on actions.  Actions are 
important because they have consequences.  Thoughts and 
motivations are only relevant to the extent that they result in 
actions.  It is for this reason that in defining and calibrating 
the matters that are relevant to sentencing, considerations 
relating to the mental state of the offender are relatively minor 
considerations.  Substance abuse impacts an individual’s 
thoughts, but has only an indirect connection to his or her acts.  
Accordingly, substance involvement can, at most, engage with 
a consideration which is a relatively minor variable in the 
sentencing calculus.  As it transpires, this variable is not 
enlivened at all, given that there is no clear-cut basis for 
increasing or decreasing the culpability of an offender on the 
basis of substance involvement. 
In particular, substance involvement should not aggravate 
penalty.  While there is an increased likelihood of crime being 
committed due to substance involvement, the extent of the 
increase is not so significant to warrant a higher penalty.  
Further, a drug influenced crime is no more inherently 
blameworthy than crime committed for other reasons.  In some 
cases, drug-affected crime might lead to a more serious 
instance of a crime than other forms of the same offense (for 
example the offender may act more violently).  But if this does 
occur, there is ample scope to aggravate penalty on the basis of 
existing sentencing principles (for example, the principle of 
proportionality which matches the hardship of the sanction to 
the seriousness of the offense).258 
The objective of rehabilitation is the strongest argument 
for factoring in substance involvement into sentencing 
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considerations.  There is evidence that some rehabilitation 
programs are successful at treating drug use and minimizing 
recidivism.  However, most of these programs can be delivered 
without a meaningfully reduced degree of success in the prison 
setting, and hence, rehabilitation is not a powerful reason for 
reducing prison terms or opting for sanctions other than 
imprisonment for substance involved offenders. 
Given that substance involved offenders have a greater 
rate of recidivism (even if one takes into account the rate of 
success of rehabilitation programs), an argument could be 
made in support of harsher penalties for these offenders.  
However, this approach is unsound because it violates the 
principle that people should be punished for their (present) 
crimes and cannot be punished again for earlier crimes.259  The 
only viable exception to this is the objective of community 
protection.  Offenders who present a grave danger to the 
community should be incarcerated for longer periods to afford 
greater protection to the community.260  However, this applies 
only in relation to crimes which significantly damage the lives 
and interests of victims and any increase in penalty severity 
must be commensurate with the increased risk of reoffending.  
Balancing these considerations, one of us has previously 
suggested that repeat serious sexual and violent offenders 
should receive a recidivist loading in the order of 20% to 50%.261  
However, this is irrespective of substance involvement.262  
Apart from this, no further penalty enhancement is 
appropriate for recidivists. 
Ultimately, there is no rational basis for incorporating 
substance involvement into the sentencing calculus.  
Decoupling sentencing and substance use would make 
sentencing more transparent and predictable.  Most of all, it is 
the doctrinally correct approach. 
Yet it would be unsound to ignore the general link between 
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crime and substances and alcohol.  The link needs to be 
acknowledged and acted upon in at least two ways.  The first 
is from an educational perspective.  Public education 
campaigns have been held in many parts of the world, 
including the United States and Australia, regarding the 
health dangers associated with the use of drugs and alcohol.263  
This provides people with a strong reason to not use or, at least 
in the case of alcohol, over-use these substances.  The 
education campaign regarding the negative effects of 
substances should be buttressed by information regarding the 
link between substances and involvement in crime.  The fact 
that many drug and alcohol users end up in hospital is well-
known.  And that many of them wind up in prison should be 
equally well-known.  This is especially the case given that the 
harms of imprisonment extend well beyond period of 
confinement. 
Imprisonment has an adverse effect on well-being 
measures after the conclusion of the sentence, even to the point 
of significantly reducing life expectancy.  A study which 
examined the fifteen and a half year survival rate of 23,510 ex-
prisoners in the U.S. state of Georgia, found much higher 
mortality rates for ex-prisoners than for the rest of the 
population.264  There were 2,650 deaths in total, which was a 
43% higher mortality rate than normally expected (799 more 
ex-prisoners died than expected).265 The main causes for the 
increased mortality rates were: homicide, transportation 
accidents, accidental poisoning (which included drug 
overdoses), and suicide.266  Moreover, prior imprisonment has 
a profound impact on economic opportunity because it leads to 
diminished employment opportunities and reduced lifetime 
earnings of up to 40%.267 
The most significant reform that should occur to deal with 
the link between drugs, alcohol, and crime is the increased 
availability and systematization of treatment for people who 
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have substance problems.  There is a present and vast unmet 
need for programs to treat substance involved people, both 
within the general community and in prisons.268  The report by 
the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse notes: 
Of the 1.5 million inmates with substance use disorders in 
2006, CASA estimates that only 163,196 (11.2%) received 
any type of professional treatment, including treatment in 
a residential facility or unit (7.1%), professional counselling 
(5.2%) or pharmacological therapy such as methadone, 
antibuse or naltrexone (0.2%). Less than 1% (0.9%) received 
detoxification services. Inmates were likeliest to receive the 
adjunct services of mutual support/peer counselling (22.7%) 
or education (14.2%).269 
Thus, the gap between the prevalence of substance abuse 
and the availability of treatment is profound.  Treatment 
programs should be made available to all prisoners, as well as 
to substance addicts within the general community.  It has 
been established that even in purely dollar terms, the return 
on investment would be considerable.  Estimates suggest that 
every dollar spent on drug treatment programs can yield a 
saving of up to $7 in crime, incarceration, and healthcare 
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costs.270 
CONCLUSION 
The connection between drug use and crime is profound.  
Many offenders are under the influence or effect of illicit drugs 
or alcohol at the time of offending.  And most offenders have a 
substance abuse problem at the time they commit an offense.  
Moreover, the rate of substance abuse use by criminals greatly 
exceeds that of the rest of the community.  While the 
association between illicit drugs and alcohol is clear, the 
impact that this has, and should have, in determining the 
appropriate penalty for offenders is obscure.  Substance 
involvement has been held to increase penalty.  On other 
occasions it is neutral, and at times it has decreased penalty. 
The doctrinally correct approach to dealing with substance 
involvement in the sentencing calculus has been distorted by a 
number of considerations.  Principally, it has not been 
established against the backdrop of the framework of criminal 
law in general, and in particular, the appropriate objectives of 
sentencing.  The main purpose of criminal law is to prevent 
and punish bad deeds; namely conduct which damages the 
interests of individuals and the wider community.  Drug 
induced crime causes no less harm than crime committed by 
drug-free offenders.  An offender’s exact level of 
blameworthiness for the crime is a relatively minor 
consideration in ascertaining crime severity—it is a distant 
second to the consequences stemming from the criminal act.  
This leaves only a small amount of room for substance use to 
mitigate sentence.  However, even within this small margin of 
possible adjustment to sentence, there is no basis for altering 
the sentencing of drug affected offenders.  Substance 
involvement should not increase penalty from the reference 
point of culpability.  Even if the offender is aware that drug or 
alcohol use may increase the likelihood of offending, this is no 
more blameworthy than other triggers of crime such as greed, 
anger, or revenge.  Mitigation founded on considerations 
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relating to culpability for drug involved offenders should not be 
accorded given that there is a meaningful degree of choice 
exercised by offenders in either deciding to initially commence 
using substances, or continuing to persist with the use of illicit 
drugs or alcohol. 
The strongest basis for reducing the severity of sentences 
for drug involved offenders is because, ostensibly, this could 
improve the rehabilitation prospects of offenders.  However, 
this justification fails for two reasons.  First, to the extent that 
rehabilitative programs are effective, their success is not 
meaningfully diminished by the fact they are delivered in the 
prison setting.  Thus, the objective of rehabilitation does not 
necessarily lighten penalties.  Rather it provides a reason for 
ensuring that whatever penalty is imposed, should be coupled 
with a condition that the offender undergo a mandatory drug 
treatment program.  The arguments in favor of reducing 
penalty for considerations of mitigation are even more 
definitively negated by the fact that most drug involved 
offenders are not rehabilitated, and in fact have a higher 
recidivism rate than other offenders. 
The solution to dealing with drug involved offending in the 
sentencing calculus is to ignore it.  This will inject clarity and 
doctrinal coherence into the sentencing system.  It will also 
make the system fairer.  There is a need to respond to the link 
between substance involvement and crime.  However, the 
response is not via the sentencing system.  The first response 
is to have a wide-ranging and systematic community education 
campaign regarding the link between drugs, alcohol, and 
crime.  This will provide people with an additional reason to 
avoid falling into substance use and abuse.  In addition to this, 
it is important that there are greater resources devoted to drug 
and alcohol treatment.  All substance involved offenders 
should have access to such programs, in both the prison setting 
and the general community.  The provision of such services 
should in fact be made available to all people in the community 
who have a substance dependency problem.  Though this would 
require an additional significant public health investment, the 
return on investment would considerably exceed the cost. 
